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The onset of new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa has added 
another layer of threat to security in West Africa. There is a need for research on the 
interconnectedness among existing and new and emerging threats to security in the 
region. The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West 
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to its regional security management strategy. The 
punctuated equilibrium theory and policy feedback theory were used to conceptualize the 
problem within the context of ECOWAS’ policy inertia and the wide range of security 
and sociopolitical dynamics in the region. The research questions focused on assessing 
the effectiveness of ECOWAS’ approach to security management in West Africa. The 
research was a qualitative exploratory case study based on a grounded theory design. 
Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to recruit 12 regional security 
experts from ECOWAS headquarters and regional peace and security institutions in 
Ghana and Nigeria. Data collection techniques included in-depth interviews and 
document analysis. The findings showed that the ECOWAS’ security management 
strategy, which was effective during the internecine conflicts, was no longer successful 
with the advent of new and emerging threats to security in the region. Recommendations 
of this study include developing ECOWAS strategic concept for security management 
and drafting an ECOWAS framework for accountability. The study has implications for 
positive social change (e.g., improving perceptions of security among West African 
citizens) and policy making and professional practice (e.g., supporting an integrated 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The security situation in West Africa keeps deteriorating. Both directly affected 
countries and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional 
organization with the remit for management for regional peace and security, are 
overwhelmed by the menace from terrorist actors and other entities. ECOWAS has, in the 
past, been successful in managing intrastate conflicts in the region through troop 
deployments and mediation (Akokpari, 2016). 
However, with the inception of globalization and the post-September 11 world 
order, new and emerging security threats from terrorism, cybercrimes, and organized 
transnational and cross-border crimes have engulfed West Africa (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; 
Marc et al., 2015). Thus, the region faces two layers of security challenges. On one side 
are postcolonial and post-Cold War intrastate conflicts. On the other are new and 
emerging security threats instigated by globalization and September 11 that have, over 
time, intertwined and confounded the region's security threat variables (Onuoha & 
Ezirim, 2013).  
ECOWAS, as the recognized regional institution with the mandate of ensuring 
regional peace and security, needs to have robust strategies to be effective (Akokpari, 
2016; Marc et al., 2015). The main implication for social change for the study is the 
insight it provides on ECOWAS’ effectiveness in ensuring regional peace and security. 
This knowledge may help policy makers and security professionals in developing a more 
cohesive approach to ensuring safety and security in the West Africa region. Another 
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impact this study may have is its replicability and adaptability by other regional 
organizations and national security institutions.   
In this chapter, I provide a contextual overview of the geography and how the 
demography, history, and the political systems of West Africa have evolved. I reflect on 
the complex and buoyant social, political, commercial, and agricultural policy of 
indigenous West Africa, through the era of Trans-Atlantic trade and the partitioning of 
Africa. The discussion shows how these variables interrelate with world order and 
cataclysms to shape the region’s troubling security landscape. The chapter also includes a 
discussion of ECOWAS’ achievements and challenges and how it became a crucial 
player in the region's security management system. The chapter also includes the problem 
statement, purpose, research questions, theoretical foundation, conceptual framework, 
nature, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of 
the study. 
Background 
West Africa has experienced unique effects from a series of tumultuous global 
events from the days of slavery, colonialism, independence struggles, post-colonialism, 
the Cold War, post-Cold War, and globalization, to the current era of the post-September 
11 Global War on Terror (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2017; Pham, 2014). Each of these 
cataclysmic events affected the region’s security landscape in a peculiar way. When the 
Liberian civil war commenced in the 1990s, ECOWAS seized the initiative as a regional 
organization to send peace enforcement troops to the country. That marked the beginning 
of ECOWAS’ interference in security matters in the region (Alao, 2017; Kabia, 2016). 
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Since then, ECOWAS has gotten intricately involved in security issues affecting member 
states. ECOWAS peace operations in the region include the conflicts in Sierra Leone, 
Guinea-Bissau, La Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambian political crisis (Hirsch & Hirch 
2018).  
Although ECOWAS has had significant successes in the management of security 
in West Africa, the organization has so far operated only in the realms of peace 
operations and conflict mediation (Akokpari, 2016; Lar, 2009; Odobo et al., 2017). As 
new and emerging threats to peace and security in the region worsen without a plausible 
regional approach, it became apparent that West Africa's security challenges were going 
to deteriorate further (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; von Soest, & De Juan, 2018). Even though the 
outcomes of the changing security dynamics were anticipated, ECOWAS’ operational 
concept in managing security in the region remains problematic (Onuoha & Ezirim, 
2013; Tejpar & de Albuquerque 2015). 
The continuous worsening of the security situation in West Africa has debilitating 
effects on the already fragile humanitarian and economic conditions and fledgling 
democratic governance of countries in the region (Collier, 2017; United Nations Security 
Council, 2017). According to the United Nations Security Council Report (2012), the 
combination of the civil wars and the emergence of new threats to peace and security in 
the region “have significantly diminished human capital, social infrastructure and 
productive national development assets” (p. 2). Also, Human Rights Watch, in its 
briefing paper on West Africa to the UN Security Council in 2003 indicated that, there 
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were increased cases of sexual and gender-based violence and reprisal killings, among 
others, across the sub-region (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
In conducting this study, I sought to contribute an alternative approach to 
ECOWAS’ conflict management strategies through a framework of integrated 
assessments of the two layers of threats to the region. An alternate approach can reveal 
the interconnectedness between the two threat layers for a nuanced evaluation to bring 
them under control (see New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 
2018). When the threats interactions are established, effective measures to address the 
problem can be deduced (FES Africa Department, 2017).  
Brief History of West Africa 
West Africa lies between latitudes 5° and 20° North and longitudes 16° West and 
15° East on the globe (Maps of the World, 2017). It is bordered to the South by the Gulf 
of Guinea and to the North by the Sahara Desert. The region has an approximate area of 
eight million square kilometers (Food and Agriculture Organization Technical Papers, 
1985). West Africa is ethnically diverse region with 17 countries and has a population of 
approximately 382 million (Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Worldometers, 
2018). The dominant groups in the region are Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Akan, Ijaw, 
Mandinka, Ewe, and Wolof (Bloom & Sachs, 1999, p. 277; Michel & Zwang, 2006).  
West African countries, with the exception of Cape Verde, are among those with 
the world's fastest population growth rate (Bello-Schünemann, 2017; United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2016, p. 5; Worldometers, 2018). 
According to United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
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Population Division, as referenced by Worldometers (2018), West Africa is home to 5% 
of the world’s population, with an annual growth rate of 2.69%. The region is rich with 
many natural resources. Some of these resources include gold, coal, diamond, aluminum, 
pozzolana, fish, timber, uranium, oil and gas, titanium, and iron ore (Al Jazeera, 2018; 
ECOWAS, 2015a). 
Before the Trans-Atlantic trade and the partitioning of Africa in the nineteenth 
century, West Africa had a complex and buoyant social, political, commercial, and 
agricultural system (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2016). The region then had well-
organized vast empires like the Songhay, Mali, Ghana, and Borno; states and many 
smaller chiefdoms and acephalous communities (Blakemore & Cooksey, 2017, p. 11; 
Davidson, 2014; Wilfahrt, 2018). Although relations among the various states were 
sometimes fractious due to territorial expansionism, cultural diffusion and commercial 
activities were vibrant. Technology transfer was fluid even beyond the Sahel to the 
Mediterranean and South across the forest to the coastal Atlantic areas (Hopkins, 2014). 
The onset of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade by European merchants from 16th to 
the 19th centuries not only changed the interstate and intercommunal economic dynamics 
and also altered the socio-cultural stratifications in West Africa (Nwokeji, 2010). The 
trade flourished on both demand and supply sides. It also gave a stimulus to the culture of 
violence and internecine warfare to feed the lucrative industry (p. 201).  
As the slavery industry thrived, competition and acrimony arose among the 
European nations who scrambled for territories in West Africa. Eventually, the 
Europeans agreed amicably to partition the region (but applied to the entire continent) 
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into spheres of influence, protectorates, colonies, and free-trade-areas at the Berlin 
Conference on February 26, 1885 (Chamberlain, 2016, p xii; Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou, 2011, p. 1; Pakenham, 2015, Sect 14). The colonial borders were 
capriciously drawn based on already acquired territories by the feuding European nations. 
They disregarded ethnic homogeneity, and the socio-political exclusivity of the various 
communities (Pakenham, 2015). Figure 1 includes a map that illustrates the partitioning 
of Africa as a result of the Berlin Conference. 
Figure 1   
Map showing how Africa was partitioned in Berlin Conference - 1884. 
 
Note. Adapted from “The Berlin conference on Africa: 1884-1885,” by D.J.P. Waldie, 
2019, Timewise Traveller, para 7. Retrieved from                                                 
https://www.timewisetraveller.co.uk/berlin2.html 
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The creation of artificial barriers in the region restricted socialization among 
communities that were once together to the extent that, villages and families got 
separated from each other (Miles, 2014; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011, p. 29). 
Different official cover names were even ascribed to the same ethnic groups in the region 
to distinguish them from their kin at the other side of the boundaries by the British and 
the French colonialists (Asiwaju, 1985). For example, the Yorubas in British Nigeria 
were called Nago in French Dahomey, the Fulanis in British colonies were called Peuls in 
French colonies across the region, and the Baydyarankes in French Guinea were called 
the Bambara in Portuguese Guinea (p. 3). 
Also, thriving economic activities were negatively affected by customs charges 
and immigration documents required for crossing wares to a central market that served 
the once united community (Miles, 2015, p. 27). Traditional rulers around the border 
towns and villages, in some cases, ignored the imposed boundaries. They continued to 
mutually recognize original ownership of lands and farms overlapping into jurisdictions 
across borders in line with precolonial precincts and customary laws (Raunet, 2016). 
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Table 1  
Partitioned West African Ethnic Groups 
Serial Country* Ethnic group 
1 Benin-Nigeria Adja, Yoruba, Borgu, Hausa, Fulani 
2 Cameroon-
Nigeria 
Kanembu, Shua Arabs, Adamawa, Okoi, Wakura, Matakam, 
Gude, Veve, Jibu, Chamba, Ododop, Efik Mandara, 
3 Gambia-Senegal Wolof, Pular, Serer Mandinka, Jola, Karoninka, Manjago, Balanta 
4 Ghana-Togo Ewe, Agotime, Akposso, Konkomba, Aufo, Moba 
5 Ghana- Burkina 
Faso 




Sanwi, Afema, Lobi 
7 Guinea-Sierra 
Leone 
Mende, Susu, Baga 
8 Nigeria-Niger Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri 
*Former French colonies in Italics; Former British colonies are without emphasis.      
Note. Adapted from “Scars of partition: postcolonial legacies in French and British 
borderlands,” W.F.S. Miles, 2014, Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1d9nmvp  
Independent West Africa and the Vestiges of Colonialism 
The partitioning of West Africa and its subsequent colonization altered the 
existing socio-political mosaic by redefining the identity of the people in the region. The 
residual effects of arbitrary drawing of borderlines and superimposition of the various 
European value systems on the people through language acculturalization were still at 
play in shaping the region's polity and economic arrangements (Harbeson, 2017; 
Asiwaju, 1985, p.213). Even as West African countries tried to ignore territorial 
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boundaries to forge free trade across their borders, they still grappled with lingering 
Francophone-Anglophone competition based regional trade union divide.  (UEMOA, 
2017; ECOWAS, 2016a). 
Formation of the Economic Community of West African States  
ECOWAS is a 15-member state regional organization for West African countries 
that aims to promote economic integration across the region. Although ECOWAS was 
established in 1975, it traces its antecedent to an agreement between President Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana and President Sékou Touré of Guinea to create a Union of 
Independent African States (UIAS) in 1958 (DeLancey, 1966). The UIAS was formed 
between 1961 and 1963 and later renamed the Union of African States (UAS) to include 
Mali in a Pan-Africanist move to create what came to be known as the Ghana-Guinea-
Mali Union. The union's objective was to forge a common diplomatic representation and 
harmonized economic and monetary policies of the former British and French colonies 
(DeLancey, 1966; Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union-Union of the African States, 1962). 
Subsequently, President William Tubman of Liberia mooted a West African regional 
arrangement in 1964 with Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Adeleke, 
1995).  
 All the initial attempts at forging an integration arrangement for the region failed. 
It was instead in April 1972 when the heads of state of Nigeria and Togo, General 
Yakubu Gowon, and General Nyasingbe Eyadema took a more serious approach by 
regenerating interest in the concept and following up with visits to countries in the 
region. They managed to get the consent of their counterparts toward establishing the 
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regional organization and that eventually culminated in the signing of 'Treaty of Lagos' 
on May 28, 1975, with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of 
activity of the constituting countries (ECOWAS, 2016b, p. 6). 
 ECOWAS mandate was later expanded with a revised treaty in 1993 to 
strengthen political cooperation and accelerate the implementation of the economic 
integration policies among member states (UNECA, 2016). The agreement was followed 
up in the year 2000 by a Non-Aggression Protocol and a Protocol on Mutual Defense 
Assistance that led to the formation of an ECOWAS Standby Force (Okon & Williams, 
2018, p.47; ECOWAS, 2015b, para 1). The new treaty set out goals of a common 
economic market and a single currency and restructured the organization to give effect to 
the revised objectives with the introduction of new institutions and specialized agencies 
(ECOWAS, 2016c). 
ECOWAS Membership 
ECOWAS membership was opened exclusively for West African countries with 
geopolitical and cultural ties (ECOWAS, 2016d). ECOWAS started as a 15-member state 
organization and was joined by Cape Verde Islands in 1977 to increase its membership to 
16 encompassing the entire region. Mauritania, however, withdrew its membership in 
2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union making the organization revert to its original 15-
member state status (Kamal-Deen, 2015, p. 20; UNECA, 2016). ECOWAS members, 
therefore, constitute the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cape Verde, 
Guinea, and Niger (ECOWAS, 2016d). 
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Morocco, even though not geographically belonging to the region, formally 
applied in 2017 to join the union (Fabiani, 2018, para 5). "Morocco's bid, however, faced 
strong objections from several West African civil society organizations and economic 
interest groups" (para 6). Morocco's apparent rejection to be part of ECOWAS goes to 
confirm the close cultural and geopolitical underpinnings that define nature and 
membership criteria for the organization. Figure 2 shows the countries that are in 
ECOWAS. 
Figure 2.  
Political map of ECOWAS countries. 








Note. Adapted from “The countries of western Africa,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 
Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa#/media/1/640491 
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ECOWAS Vision Aim and Objectives  
The primary aim of ECOWAS is to foster interstate economic and political 
cooperation among member states (ECOWAS, 2016b, para7). The organization is also 
committed to enhancing the socioeconomic development of its member states by 
promoting economic integration in all fields of activity in the region (USAID, 2016, p. 1). 
Before the partition of Africa and subsequent colonization, trade among the communities 
had been smoother with free movement of people and commodities as the region was 
considered the best in the world (ECOWAS, 2016b, p. 7). According to ECOWAS 
(2016b), about three percent of the region's population live outside countries of their 
origin among the community (p. 7). 
  Realizing the need to breach the artificial barriers to free movement of people 
and commodities in the region, ECOWAS Vision 2020 was adopted by a resolution in 
2007 to reflect an "ECOWAS of People." This concept replaced the existing "ECOWAS 
of States" to give effect to a renewed impetus toward deepening interaction among people 
in the region (ECOWAS Vision 2020, 2010, pp 1&2). ECOWAS Vision 2020 seeks to: 
"To create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good 
governance and where people can access and harness its enormous resources through the 
creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation" 
(p.2). 
 The ECOWAS Revised Treaty had 15 objectives (2010, Art 3). The objectives 
led to the restructuring of a new structure to support, coordinate, harmonize, and promote 
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activities that was to facilitate the implementation of the organization's mandate while 
keeping the attainment of its vision alive and on track (Art 3). 
ECOWAS Structure 
ECOWAS has metamorphosed through three significant structural developments 
since its establishment in 1975. The first being in 1993 when the treaty was revised to 
widen the scope of its provisions and strengthen the organization's mandate with 
additional powers and provision commensurate resource requirements (UNECA, 2015, p. 
35). The second was when the Executive Secretariat was transformed into a Commission 
in 2007 and given broader latitude and authority to fast-track the regional integration 
process (p.11). The third was the smart leveraging of the revised treaty to expand the 
technical commissions from four to eight and to operationalize them. Some of these 
technical commissions' remits require member states to surrender some political and 
sovereign authority. For example, West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), West 
African Monetary Institute (WAMI), the ECOWAS Brown Card insurance certificate, 
and ECOWAS passport and travel certificate (Abbey, 2016, para1; UNECA, 2015, pp 
40&129). 
 ECOWAS runs on two branches; the Institution and Specialized Agencies. The 
institution comprises three arms of governance, namely, the Executive, the Legislature 
and the Judiciary. The governance is driven by the executive and a Chairman of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government at the apex of the structure. It also has a 
Council of Ministers and a Commission with a President, a Vice President, and 13 
Commissioners as part of the executive body (ECOWAS, 2016c, p. 1). 
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 The Community Parliament epitomizes the ECOWAS legislative body. It is 
composed of 115 seats. Each member state is guaranteed five seats, and the remaining 40 
shared by the country's population ratio in the community. It comprises two wings, 
namely; the Bureau and the Secretariat. The Bureau has the Speaker, his Deputies, and 
the Secretary-General heads the Secretariat. The two represent the governing and 
administrative organs of the Community Parliament, respectively (Community 
Parliament - ECOWAS, 2018).  
  The Community Court of Justice is the third arm of ECOWAS’ governance 
architecture. "It is composed of seven independent Judges who are persons of high moral 
character, appointed from among nationals of member states (Community Court of 
Justice - ECOWAS, 2012, para 2). It is responsible for the "interpretation and application 
of Community laws, protocols, and conventions" (ECOWAS 2016c, para 3). Over time, it 
has inspired confidence in the community of member states considered as the court of last 
resort (UNECA, 2016, p. 37; MyJoyOnline.com, 2017, p. 3).  
Problem Statement 
The problem addressed in this study was how to underpin the ECOWAS security 
management framework with assessments that integrate the interconnectedness of the 
existing and the new and emerging security threat layers in West Africa (New Jersey 
Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 2018; Willemse, de Bruijn, van Dijk, 
Both, & Muiderman, 2015). The new and emerging threats not only present another 
strand of security problem; they also inherently overlap and complicate the region's 
security threat variables (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). ECOWAS’ security management 
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strategies have failed in addressing the problem effectively (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 
2015). 
Many scholarly works have been done in the area of peace and security in West 
Africa (Dinshak & Walnshak, 2018). However, there is a lack of research on the nexus 
between postcolonial conflicts and new and emerging security threats. This gap was 
made manifest by the various context-specific and less coordinated conflict prevention 
frameworks that have failed to address the problem. The void has consequently allowed 
the threats to fester, mutate, and further complicate the threats to peace and security in the 
region (Aning, Okyere, & Abdallah, 2012; Annan 2014; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013).  
ECOWAS was initially established to foster interstate economic and political 
cooperation among member states. However, the organization added security 
management to its mandate to enable it to manage the growing threats to security in the 
region (ECOWAS, 1999; Francis, 2009). ECOWAS indicated its commitment to regional 
security management by conglomerating a force called ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) to physically handle the threat with significant successes, especially in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Cordesman, 2016; Kieh & Kalu, 2013; UN Security Council, 
2011). ECOWAS has also attempted several diplomatic initiatives. These include the 
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Ammunition and other 
Related Materials in June 2006, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in 
2008, and the Political Declaration and a Common Position against Terrorism in 2013. 
ECOWAS’ security management efforts notwithstanding, West Africa keeps 
experiencing a continuously deteriorating security environment.  
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to explore ECOWAS’ approach to regional security 
management in West Africa. In addressing the gap in the literature, I explored the 
interconnectedness among existing and new and emerging threats to security in the 
region. Uncovering how the threats interrelate may enable a more nuanced analysis of the 
problem for the adoption of a better approach to the region’s security management 
system.    
I used a qualitative methodology, relying primarily on an intertextual analysis of 
documents on regional strategies, implementation plans, and political declarations. I 
collected documents from relevant institutions and conducted in-depth interviews on the 
phenomenon with practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja and think tanks 
at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Accra, 
Ghana. I also interviewed subject matter experts at the West African Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone to assess the 
vulnerabilities of the region within the context of the threats. The interviews enabled me 
to evaluate the perspectives of academics, practitioners, and subject matter experts 
concerning existing and new and emerging threats in the region.  
Research Questions 
The overall research question (RQ1) was, how effective is ECOWAS’ current 
approach to security management in the region? I also sought to answer two other RQs: 
RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security 
problems that confront the region? 
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RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme 
of conflict management strategy? 
Theoretical Foundation 
I applied the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), developed by paleontologists 
Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, and the policy feedback theory (PFT), which 
emanated from political science from the historical institutionalist tradition (Moynihan & 
Soss, 2014). PET is primarily about a policy change that is marked by “stability and 
incrementalism” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 55). This theory is most beneficial when 
making decisions that involve a paradigm shift in the way a region handles security 
matters. I applied PET in the study to create adequate space for an in-depth analysis of 
the two layers of threats and divergent viewpoints of subject matter experts and 
practitioners while ensuring the maintenance of a more focused and holistic security 
arrangement. Thus, considering the magnitude of the problem, the socioeconomic 
dynamics of countries involved, and their weak political will in subduing their interests 
for the betterment of the entire community, the application of PET was appropriate for 
the study (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).   
The PFT provides a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles. I 
formulated the framework and organized it systematically to clarify the political 
implications of critical aspects of governance, such as the promotion of civic engagement 
to prevent “unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy designs” 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). PFT also facilitates deliberations by experts and 
     18 
 
 
practitioners to enhance the synchronization of alternative options with imperatives of 
governance to engender political support for implementation (Mettler & Soss, 2014).  
Organizational change management requires anticipation of the challenges that 
will be confronted and appropriate measures put in place (Carnall, 2018). Therefore, this 
study was premised on the policy of transparent engagement and feedback concept to 
enhance its rigor and thoroughness (see Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Also, the application 
of PFT has had a positive impact on the development of broader policy that is acceptable 
to all members of the regional community. (Moynihan & Soss, 2014). Using PFT and 
PET as the theoretical basis for the research enhanced a better understanding of the level 
of complementarity among ECOWAS’ strategic concepts, doctrines, and policies and 
consequently improved the quality of the study's findings and analysis. 
Nature of the Study 
The study type was qualitative with grounded theory design. It was an exploratory 
case study based on a formative evaluation research methodology. I relied primarily on 
an intertextual analysis of documents on regional strategies, implementation plans, and 
political declarations by ECOWAS member states. The study began with an exploration 
of the prevailing security situation among member states to establish the current threats 
profile and the region's vulnerabilities to them. ECOWAS architecture and strategies for 
the management of its members' security were subjected to formative evaluation to assess 
their inherent challenges as well as the effectiveness and efficacy of their implementation 
process. This approach enhanced proffering alternative strategies and also helped in 
contextualizing aspects of social value (Kozleski, 2017).  
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I applied the purposive sampling and the snowball data collection technique for 
this study. I conducted in-depth interviews and document analysis to gather data. I 
performed both electronically and manually (for participants who declined electronic 
recording) recorded interviews through one-on-one, Semi-structured, open-ended 
questions with follow-ups. I also used field notes in conjunction with the interviews for 
keeping track of schedules, recording vital points for follow-ups, and facilitating better 
data management (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Participants for in-depth interviews were 
selected based on their knowledge, expertise, and experience on the subject matter, as 
well as their availability and willingness to provide the needed information (Maxwell, 
2012).  
The snowball technique created the flexibility for including two unanticipated 
participants whose contributions were useful to the exercise. According to Maxwell 
(2012), using multiple methods is a common feature of qualitative research. Duplicating 
sources enhanced information gathering on different aspects of the study, and yielded the 
triangulation to maximize strength and addressed the limitations of methods being 
applied. The snowball technique also allowed me to depend on my primary participants’ 
experiences for recommendations on who else to engage as data collection progressed.   
The critics of qualitative research argue that the methodology is not scientific 
enough for credibility compared to quantitative methods (Sarma, 2015). On the other 
hand, Marshall (1996) asserts that when a study seeks to answer humanistic "why" and 
"how" questions, qualitative studies do it better (p. 522). The exploratory nature of the 
research also influences the choice of qualitative methodology, requiring in-depth 
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interviews to gain insight into multiple angles and to assess different sides of the problem 
(Marshall, 1996, p. 253). According to Maxwell (2012), the research situation is also a 
determining factor in choosing a methodology for research. 
Additionally, this study enhanced a detailed and nuanced understanding of the 
various groups that competed for space in security matters of the region. The qualitative 
research paradigm provides better options that afforded the needed degree of immersion 
into the study (Atieno, 2009). Also, the qualitative approach facilitated the 
synchronization and harmonization of multiple perspectives of the various national 
strategies and doctrines, respectively, for the application of best practices in conflict 
management. 
Definitions 
Following is a list of key terms used in the study and their definitions. Appendix 
A contains a list of acronyms used in the study. 
Emerging security threats: New or mutated threats to security that may require an 
exclusive and nonconventional approach to manage. These include radicalization, 
extremism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, challenges to 
democratic governance, and piracy. The threats could be criminal, religious extremist, or 
political in nature (Cherkaoui, 2017, pp. 10, 19; Security Council Report, 2011, p. 1). 
Integrated threat management: A comprehensive and nuanced approach to 
identifying and analyzing multilayered threats to regional security for timely 
implementation of appropriate preemptive and remedial measures for addressing the 
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menace (Korb, Duggan, & Conley, 2009; United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 
2016).   
Operational control: The authority granted to a military commander in a UN 
peacekeeping operation to direct forces so that the commander may accomplish specific 
missions or tasks (UN, 2009). Operational control statuses are usually limited by 
function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and military 
personnel, and to retain or assign tactical command or control of those units/personnel 
(UN, 2009).  
Partition of Africa: A term, also known as “scramble for Africa” and the 
“Conquest of Africa,” which refers to the carving of the continent into European colonial 
territories during the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885. Between 1884 and 1914, the entire 
African continent except for Liberia, Ethiopia, and Somalia was shared among England, 
France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain (Courtney, 2017, p. 1; Worldfacts, 
2018, p. 2).    
Peace and security architecture: The combination of structures, objectives, 
principles, and values, as well as decision-making and implementation processes that 
compose the entire conflict management framework of an organization (Degila & 
Amegan, 2019; Delegation of the European Union to Nigeria and ECOWAS, 2019). 
Regional security system: A security architecture comprising military, police, 
intelligence, and diplomatic engagements that is used by regional institutions in 
managing security threats.  
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Tasking authority: The authority that is vested in specified senior appointments of 
UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enable units (UN, 2009). Tasking 
authority includes the authority to deploy, redeploy, and employ all or part of an enabling 
unit to achieve the mission's mandate. The enabling units comprise aviation, engineering, 
logistics, medical, signals, transport, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) units 
(UN, 2009).  
Assumptions 
I had several assumptions in conducting the study. I assumed that a substantial 
number of relevant ECOWAS headquarters staff would agree to be interviewed and offer 
their objective perspectives on issues to be raised during data collection. I also assumed 
that adequate funding would be available to cover travel fares and telephone bills, as well 
as fees and incidentals for the conduct of interviews and the collection of other forms of 
data. Finally, because of the unstable security situation at many parts of Nigeria, I 
assumed that the locations for my data collection will be safe for the exercise.  
Scope and Delimitations 
Even though ECOWAS is credited with some interventions in the security 
situation of West Africa, its successes have barely exceeded the dimension of troop's 
deployment to contain intrastate conflicts (Lucey, 2016; Rodriguez, 2018). West Africa’s 
security situation has continued to deteriorate due to the intricate infusion of the new and 
emerging security threats with the existing interstate conflicts (Cherkaoui, 2017; Security 
Council Report 2011). This study specifically explored the interconnectedness among the 
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current and the new and emerging security threat layers in West Africa to enhance 
ECOWAS’ security management framework.  
Although this study made references to ECOWAS’ accomplishments and 
challenges, it did not delve into the details of the organization’s failures and successes in 
the region’s security management. It also did not assess specific national or other 
supranational security management entities operating within the region. The study, 
however, focused on exploring how ECOWAS could coordinate and harmonize the 
plethora of security operations conducted by those national and supranational security 
management entities for a better systematically organized and thoroughness in managing 
the problem.    
The theories applied in the study were the PET and the PFT. While the PET 
provided the basis for a policy change and paradigm shift needed to drive the study, the 
PFT enabled the generation of a systematic clarification of policy implications to the 
interrelated concepts and ideas (Mettler & Soss, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). 
Another related theory that would have been considered in the study is Innovation and 
Diffusion Models (IDM). The IDM enables studies to assess policy diffusion and draw 
inferences across political systems. IDM, however, works better when dealing with 
socioeconomic in well-established unions like the United States and possibly, the 
European Union (Heikkila & Cairney 2014). 
Limitations 
ECOWAS has English, French, and Portuguese speaking member states. Data 
collection was, however, primarily conducted in English. Interpreters were not used since 
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all participants, including those from non-Anglophone countries, opted to have the 
interview in English. Still, I had to make meaning out of their linguistic limitations by 
cross-checking with some of the respective non-Anglophone participants for clarity. 
ECOWAS has offices in each of the 15 member states; however, onsite data collection 
from ECOWAS staff for this study was conducted at the ECOWAS headquarters at 
Abuja, Nigeria.   
Also, due to resource constraints, secondary data were collected from think tanks, 
regional institutions, and subject matter experts in Ghana and Nigeria only. A deliberate 
effort was made to get the respondents' perspectives to cover all the three linguistic 
segments of ECOWAS countries to include respondents from Francophone and 
Lusophone countries at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja. Additionally, the study 
applied published works and open-source data for modular referencing, contextualization, 
and cross-evaluation with the UN, African Union (AU), and other regional organizations. 
Significance 
The onsets of the new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa 
have increased the vulnerability of the region to security risks (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; 
Marc et al., 2015). This situation has heightened tension levels, and considering the 
fragility of the region's socio-cultural and geopolitical dynamics, the problem can 
deteriorate beyond the capacity of ECOWAS to manage. The uncertainty of the 
circumstance is not only inimical to good governance and development of democratic 
culture, but it is also a disincentive to infrastructural growth and local and foreign 
investments. The infrastructural growth is critical to moving the countries from the 
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doldrums of economic hardships (Annual Report of ECOWAS, 2016; Runde et al., 
2016).   
Significance to Practice  
ECOWAS has made a significant impact on security management in West Africa. 
However, the organization’s inadequate vulnerability assessments of the region, 
particularly from the perspective of the combined effects of the existing and new and 
emerging threats has affected its effectiveness as the security situation deteriorates 
relentlessly (Maiangwa, 2017; Tejpar & de Albuquerque, 2015). Thus, this study delved 
into the interconnectedness of the two layers of threats and integrated them to get a closer 
shot at the threat landscape for the development of more nuanced strategic options for 
ECOWAS to implement. The study was also aimed at contributing to the improvement of 
the ECOWAS approach to security management in West Africa to facilitate the creation 
of a conducive environment for regional and global trade and investments, development, 
and better living standards for the people (Harris, 2017; Runde et al., 2016). 
Significance to Theory 
The significance of theories in research includes enabling me to organize ideas for 
establishing the interconnections between the abstract and the wider importance of data 
generated to arrive at some conclusions (Neuman, 1997; Sunday, N D). This study 
applied the punctuated equilibrium and the policy feedback theories to advance 
compelling reasons for the need for a paradigm shift in ECOWAS’ management of 
security threats in West Africa. This study, therefore, did not just provide an alternative 
to the organization's existing security management efforts but also proffered an effective 
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course of action in managing the problem (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 
2014).  
Significance to Social Change  
ECOWAS, as a regional organization, serves as the first reference point for its 
member states on regional security matters (De Wet, 2014; Maiangwa, 2017). Since this 
study targeted the institutionalization of a more practical alternative for threat 
management for ECOWAS, it will have a significant region-wide impact for social 
change. Thus, ECOWAS member states will, apart from benefiting from the effective 
region-wide security architecture, can also extract applicable strategies and best practices 
to enhance their various national security policies.  
Besides West Africa, other regional organizations with peace and security 
mandate on the African continent can adapt the study. These regional organizations 
include the South African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD) (comprising countries from the Horn of Africa, the 
Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes) and the African Union (AU) (De Wet, 2014; 
Siradag, 2012). Consequently, this study could have significant implications for positive 
social change for substantial parts of Africa that share analogous security dynamics 
(Burgess, 2008; Mazrui, 1996). 
Summary and Transition 
Chapter 1 began by providing brief insight into the geography and demography of 
the region to locate the setting and provide an understanding of how the people 
interrelated across the region. The chapter then traced the history of ECOWAS by 
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delving into the antecedents of West Africa from the era of slavery through the 
partitioning of Africa into colonial territories by some European countries up to the 
independence period. Chapter 1 also introduced the nexus between the vestiges of 
colonialism and the challenges ECOWAS faced as a regional institution from its 
embryonic stage going forward (ECOWAS, 2016a; UEMOA, 2017). Additionally, 
ECOWAS formation, vision, objectives, and structure were also highlighted. 
 Chapter 2 has the available literature and unveiled the gap in the study. It was an 
exploratory case study based on the formative evaluation of the materials gathered. The 
chapter also outlined the strategy for the search of the literature and then thematically 
reviewed the significant works related to the primary research questions of this study.




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I outlined the background and context for the formation of 
ECOWAS by delineating Africa's geopolitical history from the period before the Trans-
Atlantic trade through its partitioning into colonial territories by some Western European 
countries to the independence era. I also highlighted the transformation of ECOWAS 
from an exclusive economic block to successes in regional peace operations efforts 
(Adetula, Bereketeab, & Jaiyebo, 2016). Then, I underscored the emergence of terrorism, 
cybercrimes, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes in the region as another 
threat layer to the existing destructive conflicts. I went further to highlight the increasing 
mutation of the two layers of threat and the need to explore their interconnectedness in 
the region's security landscape (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Marc et al., 2015).  
There is extensive literature on ECOWAS’ roles in managing security in West 
Africa (Dinshak & Walnshak, 2018). However, studies on security management 
strategies the regional organization could employ remain limited. In this chapter, I review 
relevant literature that is germane to the topic to identify the gaps and inherent 
weaknesses. In this literature review, I discuss the thematic areas relative to the primary 
RQs of this study. These thematic areas included colonially induced identity conflicts in 
West Africa, the Cold War era and peace and security in West Africa, ECOWAS’ 
involvement in managing peace and security in West Africa, the effects of the War on 
Terror on peace and security in West Africa, and ECOWAS’s operational peace and 
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security architecture. Other themes discussed are the advent of an additional layer of 
peace and security challenges in West Africa, ECOWAS’s Concept of Operations in the 
management of the new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa, and 
ECOWAS’s challenges in its management of two layers of the threat to peace and 
security in West Africa. I also discuss the literature search strategy and provide more 
information on the study’s theoretical foundation and conceptual framework. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I focused my literature search on peer-reviewed publications within a 5-year 
range of 2015 to 2019. I extended the search to the previous 10 years (up to the year 
2009) for critical documents and peer-reviewed articles concerning ECOWAS policies 
and strategies and those of similar regional organizations. In this regard, I explored the 
Walden University Library, KAIPTC Library, University of Cape Coast, and University 
of Ghana databases and JSTOR for related materials to establish gaps in the literature.  
I also consulted web search engines and databases such as Google Books and 
Google Scholar. Additionally, I also searched for books and articles from other online 
databases such as pdfdrive.net, Gutenberg.org, and archive.org. The keywords that I used 
for the searches included conflict, ECOWAS, West Africa, management, regional, threats, 
organization, terrorism, transnational, peace, crime, and security.  
Theoretical Foundation 
I combined the PET and PFT as the foundation for the theoretical framework for 
the study. Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould developed the PET, and the PFT 
originated from the historical institutionalist tradition of political science (Moynihan & 
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Soss, 2014). PET primarily addresses matters relating to a policy change marked by 
"stability and incrementalism" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 55). PET is most beneficial 
when policy makers are taking decisions that involve a paradigm shift in the way a region 
handles security matters. The theory was applied in the study because it facilitates 
concurrent analysis of the two layers of threats and also accommodates exploration of 
divergent viewpoints of subject matter experts and practitioners while ensuring the 
maintenance of a more focused and holistic security arrangement. Thus, considering the 
need for paradigm shift for ECOWAS’s response to nonconventional and asymmetric 
security threats, the application of PET was appropriate for the study (Aning & Pokoo, 
2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). 
The PFT, on the other hand, provided a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, 
and principles. The framework is formulated and organized systematically to clarify the 
political implications of critical aspects of governance, such as the promotion of civic 
engagement to prevent “unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy 
designs” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). PFT also facilitates deliberations by subject 
matter experts and practitioners that enhance the synchronization of alternative options 
with imperatives of governance to engender political support for implementation (Mettler 
& Soss, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).  
Managing organizational change comes with many challenges. Therefore, I 
applied the concept of transparency in policy engagement and feedback afforded by PFT 
and PET to get security managers to participate in the study (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). 
The application of PFT may have a positive impact on the development of broader policy 
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that will not only be acceptable to all members of the regional community but will also 
resonate with political actors and leaders of member states (Moynihan, & Soss, 2014; 
Sabatier & Weible, 2014). 
Literature Review Related to Key Variables and/or Concepts  
Colonially Induced Identity Conflicts in West Africa 
The role of colonialism in shaping the sociopolitical mosaic of West Africa is 
epitomized by the turbulence that has bedeviled the region since the period of the 
struggles for independence (Aghemelo & Ibhasebhor, 2006; Davidson, 2014). From its 
“fuzzy and illogical geographical definition” (Davidson, 2014. P. 6), arbitrary border re-
demarcations, through repressive colonial and neocolonial regimes by European imperial 
powers, the region was primed for a long journey of political instability, civil wars, and a 
weak economy and national institutional structures (Davidson, 2014, p. 6; Harbeson, 
2017). Although ECOWAS’ roles in containing many of these tumultuous situations are 
recorded, the rippling effects and the follow-on activities of colonial interventionism in 
the region continue to hinder the organization's efforts. 
Upsurge in self-determination and secessionist agitations .  
Since the decolonization of sub-Saharan countries began in the 1950s, issues 
regarding self-determination have kept popping-up across the West African region 
(Whelan, 1992). The struggles for separate states by many groups signify dissatisfaction. 
In many instances, it results in the people’s rejection of the national and international 
boundary arrangements bequeathed to the region by the colonial enterprise (Small, 2017; 
Bannon and Collier, 2003). Apart from separatist agitations and identity conflicts, 
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xenophobic tendencies, especially nomadic herder-farmer conflicts, have increased 
monumentally in the region due to its arbitrary partitioning and colonization (Adams & 
van de Vijver, 2017; Kyereko, 2018).  
Achankeng (2013) posits that African conflicts are not mainly problems of 
governance or institutional failures. And that, the conflicts are, in many cases, rooted in 
colonial factors. Achankeng (2013) also finds powerful countries and global and regional 
organizations complicit in perpetuating the mistakes of European imperialism on the 
continent (p. 34). Achankeng (2013) also blames the untidy decolonization and 
independence granting arrangements by the colonial powers that set the stage for many 
conflicts in the region. He cited the French and British Trusteeships merger in Cameroon 
as an example of how European imperialism fueled conflicts in Africa (p. 14). 
Colonialism, therefore, left fundamental problems of secessionism and identity in its 
trails. These externally imposed legacies have made it very difficult to resolve conflicts in 
West Africa without delving back into the nuances of the region's historical, socio-
cultural, and geopolitical antecedents (Google Arts and Culture, 2014; Harbeson, 2017; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). 
In assessing major secessionist movements in post-colonial Africa, Bereketeab 
(2014) points out serious inconsistencies. He especially cites the application of 
international law by the UN and the African Union to deal with self-determination issues. 
Bereketeab (2014) also examines Africa's major post-colonial separatist agitations. He 
highlights how the regional organizations' inconsistencies and inadequacies in managing 
them have rather complicated matters and also contributed to their escalation. Bereketeab 
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(2014), citing Trzcinski (2004) and Tuttle (2004); defined secessionism as "political 
withdrawal from an established state ... and includes territorial disintegration through 
severance of part of an existing state territory" (p. 7). The consent and recognition of the 
international community are, however, key to a successful secession. The successes of 
Eritrea and South Sudan and unsuccessful ones in the cases of Somaliland and 
Ambazonia in Western Cameroon epitomize this phenomenon (Oduah, 2017; Searcey, 
2018). The roles played by global and international organizations like the UN, the 
OAU/AU, and ECOWAS in the scheme of things, therefore, make them intricately part 
of a problems-solutions duality conundrum of separatist conflicts in the region 
(Bereketeab, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Oduntan, 2015). 
Rise in farmer-herder conflict.  
Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike (2015), while examining management 
strategies of farmer-herder conflict in West Africa, argue that various governments have 
resorted to the expulsion of the herders since they were considered as non-indigenes in 
the country. That typifies the experience of the Fulani nomadic race in West Africa.   The  
Fulani people live in every state across the West African subregion and maintain strong 
cultural bonds and ethnic connections, which cut across national boundaries (Gordon, 
2000). The Fulani preserved their unique cultural identity regardless of their location. The 
zealous preservation of cultural identity coupled with their nomadic lives as pastoralists 
have made the Fulani people to be associated with being 'foreign,' regardless of the length 
of time they spent in many countries in West and Central Africa (Bukari, & Schareika, 
2015; Mbah, 2017). Cattle are an essential part of the life of Fulani people, even those 
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who have taken to other professions still keep cattle (Mbah, 2017). Fulani came up as 
migrants who arrive in the country at specific periods for grazing and leave when 
conditions become better elsewhere. The Fulani herders mostly see themselves as moving 
through the land; hence, even those born in a particular country considered their stay as 
transitionary and hardly regarded themselves as citizens (Kyereko, 2018).  
Even though farmer-pastoralist conflicts had existed long before partitioning and 
colonization of West Africa, there were no citizenship problems for the Fulani. They 
were just required to pay tribute to the chiefs or overlords of the state or territory to move 
through or settle with their flock (Adebayo, 1995; Tonah, 2005). Even though the region 
had been partitioned during the colonial era, there was no full realization of statehood 
among the states as administrative control of the colonies was in the hands of the 
Europeans which in many cases, they exercised indirectly through the existing local 
chiefs and emirs (Hill, 2009). Issues that did not present a direct existential threat to their 
dominion such movement of the Fulani pastoralists were not an issue for them (Para 15).  
Maiangwa (2017) captures the post-colonial conflicts as manifestations of identity 
issues in the form of ethnic mobilization, cultural "othering", and internal oppression of 
people simply seen as being "different" (p. 282). According to Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
as referenced by Maiangwa (2017), there was energy spillover toward internecine wars 
between many tribes and socio-political groups. The wars "contrived from perceived or 
real cultural differences that emerged with deleterious consequences for nation-building 
projects in several African countries" (p. 282). In Maiangwa's (2017) view, even though 
socio-economic, political, and environmental factors have reinforced the farmer-herder 
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conflicts in West Africa, it was the partitioning of Africa into colonial territories that has 
made it a difficult challenge to addressing the problem. Also, because of centuries of 
well-established cultural pattern of sedentary farming and unhindered and free-flowing 
nomadic lifestyle of pastoral herdsmen across the region, the imposed geographical 
boundaries have become more disruptive and deepened identity and otherness tensions 
between the two groups (Blench, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). 
It is noteworthy that the spirit of self-determination and a sense of statehood 
gathered momentum for decolonization in the 1950s and 60s. The movement kindled the 
enthusiasm on issues of identity, irredentism, and otherness among West African 
countries (Moritz, 2010; Tonah, 2002; 2006). This situation has negatively affected the 
pastoral Fulani herders who have traversed the region for centuries. However, it is not 
only the Fulani herders who have been objects of the discriminatory practices, but 
migratory groups of traders and artisanal greener pasture seekers have also suffered mass 
deportation because they are either considered not to belong or not citizens enough. For 
instance, referencing Akrasil, (2012) and Ibrahim (2012), Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-
Uzodike, (2015) indicate how the post-colonial governments in Nigeria and Ghana, 
expelled pastoral herdsmen from their Plateau State and Brong Ahafo Region 
respectively following clashes with plant farmers.  Senegal similarly deported the 
herdsmen out of the country.  
OAU/AU and ECOWAS’ dilemma of maintaining colonial borders.  
The OAU/AU and subsequently ECOWAS have both encountered the dilemma of 
either maintaining or reversing the inherited colonial borders in West Africa. Soon after 
     36 
 
 
the formation of OAU, the issues of removing colonial borders had generated serious 
arguments among the various contrasting ideological groups (the Brazzaville, 
Casablanca, and Monrovia Groups) before the Cairo Resolution was eventually passed 
(Zoppi, 2013). The OAU passed the 1964 Cairo Resolution that declared that "the borders 
of African States, on the day of their independence, constituted a tangible reality" and 
that "all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their 
achievement of national independence" (Organization of African Unity Secretariat, 
1964).  
 Notwithstanding the Cairo declaration, the OAU was still not consistent with the 
issues of inherited colonial frontiers since the organization itself metamorphosed from a 
pan-African movement that championed the removal of all vestiges of colonialism from 
the continent (Murray, 2004; Zoppi, 2013). The OAU did not evenly manage self-
determination disputes and irredentist movements across the continent. For example, the 
OAU overlooked the Pan-Somali activism for a separate homeland for all Somalis in the 
Horn of Africa (Gunn, 2017). Conversely, in 1982, 26 OAU member States recognized 
the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and subsequently admitted to the 
organization's Council of Ministers. Later in 1984, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) was seated at the OAU summit. 
Subsequently, Morocco withdrew its OAU membership in protest until its readmission in 
2017 (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).   
 Small (2014) explores how President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana vigorously 
pursued an "unintended legacy" that has shaped Africa in a paradoxical circumstance of 
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retention of colonial frontier arrangements in the face of the struggle against imperialism 
and yearn for the right to self-determination across the continent (pp. 69-74). Small 
(2014) further points out that the concept of self-determination for African countries 
during the early independence era had the potential to upset the decolonization roadmap. 
He adds that Nkrumah astutely got the OAU to adopt the Cairo Resolution after setting 
precedents in his country and the Congo by nipping in the bud, tribal and religiously 
based political activism through the parliament and then getting the UN to prevent the 
Katanga secession (p. 73). Thus, while Nkrumah was struggling to keep the Katanga 
region as part of the Congo in the name of continental unity, he conversely engaged in a 
vigorous separatist scheme to decouple the then British Togoland Trust Territory for 
independent Ghana (Austin, 1963; Kah, 2016; Monfils, 1977). 
 Small (2014) further indicates how some African leaders declared the Congo 
crisis as a watershed in African history with the propensity for spreading and eventually 
undermining the OAU's agenda for continental reunification (p. 69). The leaders referred 
to the burning issues of separatism in Congo's (now Democratic Republic of Congo) 
Katanga and Kasai regions at the United Nations General Assembly. They got OAU's 
endorsement to block the secession (p. 69). There were many African leaders of the time, 
like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who strongly advocated for the OAU's adoption of 
Resolution AHG/Res.16 (I) in 1964 (Cairo Resolution) that declared the colonially 
inherited borders inviolable. This Resolution got reaffirmed as Article 4 (b) in para 3.3 of 
the AU Constitutive Act. 
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 Considered Africa's doctrine of uti possidetis juris, West African countries have 
consistently applied the Cairo Resolution in settling the land and maritime border 
disputes from regional to global adjudicatory bodies. Landmark cases of land and 
maritime border dispute settlements include the International Court of Justice judgment 
of 2013 on the Burkina Faso-Niger land border dispute and the International Court of 
Justice Reports of Judgments of 1998 on the Nigeria-Cameroun land and maritime border 
dispute. Others include the International Court of Justice Judgments of 1986 on the 
Burkina Faso - Republic of Mali Frontier Dispute, the 1991 Maritime Delimitation 
dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, and the 2017 International Tribunal for the 
law of the Sea judgment on Ghana- La Côte d'Ivoire maritime border dispute (Bekker and 
van de Poll, 2017; International Court of Justice, 2018). 
 The AU and ECOWAS adoption of the Uti possidetis doctrine in settling border 
and secession cases notwithstanding, losing parties to these disputes have hardly acceded 
to these judgments which they consider not based on their disparate heritage as a people 
but grounded on colonial imperatives (Heerten, 2017; Morgan, 2014). For instance, 
Heerten & Moses (2014) highlights the Nigeria-Biafra secessionist war as a pivotal 
period for yearning and struggling for self-determination by various groups who claim 
ethnic affiliations in the post-colonial history of West Africa (pp. 169-170). Heerten & 
Moses (2014) also imputes the crime of genocide against the people of Biafra. The blame 
is placed squarely on colonialism for bringing people with diverse cultures and mores 
together as a nation. The international community is culpable for its failure to hold the 
Federal Government of Nigeria in check and subsequently accountable for excesses 
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during the war, invoking the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs (p.175; 
Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000).  
  Indeed, there are many conflict hotspots in West Africa, where a couple of 
separatist groups continue to challenge the new Uti possidetis status quo (Whelan, 1992). 
The separatist groups in the region include a Tuareg ultranationalist - National Movement 
for the Salvation of Azawad of Northern Mali, the Ambazonia separatist of Cameroun, 
the Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance (MFDC) of Senegal and the 
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in Nigeria 
(Al Jazeera and News Agencies, 2018; Bax, 2017; Bereketeab, 2014; Lewis, 2012). The 
imposition of colonial boundaries by imperial Europe, reinforced by the adoption of 
Cairo Resolution by the ECOWAS, remain among the difficulties that hamper a lasting 
solution to many conflicts in the region (Oduntan, 2015; Vines, 2013). Also noteworthy 
is the existence of internecine conflicts in pre-colonial West Africa, yet, it was the 
region's partitioning and subsequent colonization that intensified and prolonged the 
conflicts. The long period of colonization also set the region up for continued exploitation 
of its resources for the development of metropolitan Europe (Afisi, 2009; Annan, 2014). 
Various works of literature discussed have deliberated on several aspects of the 
problem and ECOWAS’ roles in regional conflict management. That notwithstanding, the 
writers fell short of delving into detailing the two-pronged nature of the problem and how 
their interconnectedness affects the efficacy of the various intervention measures 
implemented by ECOWAS. Although, writings on significant influences of the vestiges 
of colonialism on the region's conflict dynamics have helped in understanding the roots 
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of the conflicts in the region, how existing threats combine with the new and emerging 
ones to complicate matters have not been considered. This study delves into the problem 
with a bifocal standpoint to ensure a more nuanced evaluation of the problem. 
The Cold War and Peace and Security in West Africa 
At independence, countries in West Africa were contending with the effects of 
twin external phenomena of neo-colonialism and the Cold War.  There are no records of 
armed kinetic exchanges in the West African region directly attributable to the Cold War 
superpower wrangling during the period.  However, the relationship between countries in 
the region and their internal political systems was, to no small extent, defined by the 
phenomenon (Spies, 2018; Hetch, 2011; Harris, 2017). For example, during the Biafra 
War, countries from both the West (United Kingdom) and the East (Soviet Union) took 
turns to provide materiel support to the Federal Government side thereby contributing to 
the high levels of casualties recorded (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Ugochukwu, 2010;). The 
Cold War that began just after the Second World War led by two great allied powers – 
the United States and the Soviet Union also operated in symbiosis with countries that 
have neo-colonial and hegemonic interest to complicate the security situation in West 
Africa (Pateman, 2003; Lewis, 1967). The fragility of newly independent states in West 
Africa made them vulnerable to the cataclysmic tentacles of the Cold War East-West 
divide (de Sousa, 2016; Olympio, 1961). 
 Regionally, the East-West ideological blocs were replicated in West Africa in 
general, precipitating the formation of two prominent groups known as the Casablanca 
Group and the Monrovia Group. The Casablanca bloc was led by Kwame Nkrumah 
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(Ghana) with Sékou Touré (Guinea), and Modibo Keita (Mali) as other West African 
members with King Mohammed V (Morocco) as the North African member. The 
Casablanca group was Eastern and socialist-oriented with the Pan-Africanist agenda. The 
Monrovia bloc, on the other hand, included West African countries like Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey (Benin Republic), 
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Niger. Unlike the Casablanca bloc, the Monrovia bloc 
was a pro-Western nationalist group that advocated a gradualist approach to the 
continental union. The two opposing blocs eventually came together in conjunction with 
other continental interest groups like the Brazzaville Group, an association of former 
French colonies to found the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (Hetch, 2011; 
Genge, Kornegay, & Rule, 2010). 
 The East-West ideological rivalry of the Cold War-era trickled down to the 
domain of national political divides of many countries in West Africa. Both blocs were 
guilty of going as far as supporting one-party regimes as epitomized by the 
administrations of Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana and Félix Houphouët- Boigny of Côte 
d'Ivoire by the East and West respectively. Those alliances came on as the critical 
destabilizing factor in the region's security and governance system (Amanor-Lartey, 
2015; Aning, & Bah, 2009; Campbell, 2011; Dumbuya, 2008).  
In Ghana, for instance, while President Nkrumah was known to have his 
ideological leaning towards the former United Socialist Soviet Russia led Eastern bloc, 
the main opposition political party of the country claimed allegiance to the US-led 
Capitalist West. The bitter rivalry between the Nkrumah administration and the 
     42 
 
 
opposition group, the subsequent overthrow of the government, and the eventual 
handover of power to the pro-Western opposition political party pointed to a possible 
scheme in which the United States was complicit (Mwakikagile, 2015; Pateman, 2003). 
Also, during the Nigerian Civil War, President de Gaulle of France is cited for having 
alongside the apartheid South Africa to have assisted the Biafra side while the Soviet 
Union, Egypt, and Algeria supported the Federal troops (Pateman, 2003; Stent, 1973). 
 While referencing Komer Report (1965), Mwakikagile (2015) indicated that 
Robert W. Komer, a US National Security Council staffer advised his bosses as follows: 
"we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures 
have been planning one for some time, and Ghana's deteriorating economic condition 
may provide the spark" (p. 109; Lee, 2001). Mwakikagile (2015) minced no word in 
blaming the Nkrumah overthrow squarely on the US government as the allegations that it 
"created or exacerbated the conditions that favored a coup and did so for the express 
purpose for bringing one about" (109). 
  Additionally, Nwakikagile (2015) considered the American Central Intelligence 
Agency's (CIA) intricate contribution to the violent coup to ouster Nkrumah as an 
epitome of the Western governments and intelligence agencies collaboration during the 
Cold War in perpetuating "the most tragic events in the history of post-colonial Africa" 
(p. 118). Nwakikagile (2015), however, concedes that domestic some existing socio-
economic factors galvanized local resistance that spurred the coup leaders into action but 
with the West's covert facilitation and support. Also linked, was, the security and 
intelligence support the United States provided the capitalist-oriented opposition leader, 
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Dr. K.A. Busia. Dr. Busia was appointed the Chairman of the National Advisory 
Committee by the military regime that toppled the Nkrumah administration and got 
subsequently elected the prime minister of Ghana in an election supervised by the same 
military government (p. 176-179). 
 On the other hand, in de Sousa (2016), the author recounts Cuba and Soviet 
Union's involvement in African Marxist movements with political and military support 
during the Cold War era to counterbalance Western dominance in the region. Many 
African decolonization movements exploited the Cold War to advance their causes, and 
the Soviet-led Eastern bloc offered a veritable alternative. For many such movements, it 
was not necessarily about their quest for the Marxist ideology. It was more about the 
diplomatic leverage, financial assistance, and the military support they could gain from 
the Eastern bloc to enable them to break away from the yoke of colonialism and also to 
withstand the overhanging menace of neo-colonialism (Scarnecchia, 2018). Therefore, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many African countries switched toward the 
West for democratic governance, capital investment, and technological support. (Bassist, 
2018; Cascais, 2017)   
 Scarnecchia (2018) explores the interplay of global, regional, and national 
interests of the Cold War era on the African continent. The author gives a bifocal 
assessment of the complex Cold War relationships from "the perspectives of both the 
Cold War powers and that of Africans" (pp. 383-390). Scarnecchia also delved into the 
turf war that characterized the era among the various competing interests and interactions 
from the independence struggles through the post-independence neocolonial phases.  
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 While referencing Lee (2010) and Byrne (2013), Scarnecchia (2018) indicated a 
successful attempt at creating a third ideological bloc that aligned to neither of the Cold 
War divides (East and West). The leaders of the new bloc were "Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru of India, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, President Sukarno of 
Indonesia, and Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana" (p. 384). This move by these 
influential third world leaders was not taken lightly by the Cold War powers. Both the 
Soviet Union and the United States especially saw their interest in the region threatened 
by the Non-Aligned Movement. For instance, Scarnecchia (2018), argued about how the 
East-West Cold War rivalry impacted on security in Africa that, "the Americans were 
always in the driver's seat, while the Soviets watched from the sidelines as events in the 
Congo unfolded according to the US scenario" (as cited in Mazov, 2010, p. 177).  
 Indeed, Watts et al. (2018) have asserted that "in attempting to ensure that 
partners in Africa remained aligned with the United States rather than the Soviets, the 
United States might well have aggravated domestic political tensions and ultimately 
increased the incidence of civil wars on the continent" (p. 83). Marc et al. (2015) 
particularly pointed to the United Kingdom and France as critical players in post-Cold 
War conflicts in West Africa (as cited in N'Diaye, 2011). France's refusal to gracefully 
accept Guinea's (Conakry) quest to staying out of its (France's post-colonial) community 
epitomized the kind of neo-colonial machinations the former colonial master had hatched. 
Guinea's fractious decolonization process led to France imposing economic blockade and 
political isolation of Guinea (Du Bois, 1963; Marc et al., 2015). 
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 There is no gainsaying that the various African leaders and political elites 
exploited the fog of the Cold War to advance their quest for continental decolonization. 
However, their achievements came at a very high price because, while they focused on 
attaining independence, the superpowers had a longer-term neo-colonization plan. They 
used their economic influence, global political clout, and superior intelligence network 
and military power as leverage to pursue their objectives (Marc et al., 2015; Nkrumah, 
1965). Marc et al. (2015) argue that the superpowers encouraged and in some instances, 
established puppet regimes in the region which were left weakened and exposed to 
threats of rebellion when they became irrelevant in the post-Cold War period (as cited in 
Luckham, 1982; N'Diaye, 2011). Marc et al. (2015) sum it up as follows: 
Support to states with very strong ties to the former colonial power—such as 
Houphouët-Boigny's Côte d'Ivoire, Samuel Doe's Liberia, and Gnassingbé 
Eyadéma's Togo, gave authoritarian leaders carte blanche to exercise repressive 
means of control. The end of the Cold War triggered the collapse of central 
authority in many West African countries, either directly or indirectly. As 
unconditional backing ended overnight, the supply of arms, military assistance 
programs, funding, and other interventions dried up (p.10). 
Certainly, the Cold War has contributed immensely to the deterioration of the 
security situation in West Africa in diverse ways. A region bursting with post-
independence freedom got entrapped in the labyrinth of the Cold War complexities that 
have left its security systems precariously off-balanced (Harris, 2017; Hetch, 2011; Spies, 
2018). Even though a couple of writers and subject matter experts have sought to expose 
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the impact of the phenomenon in the region, they have come shy of proffering how to 
manage it within the context of the ECOWAS security architecture. Conversely, the Cold 
War undercurrents in the regional threat mix have not had adequate consideration in 
ECOWAS’ existing security framework. 
The Effects of the Post-September 11 Wars on Terror on Peace and Security in 
West Africa 
The declaration of the Post-September 11 War on Terror by US President G.W. 
Bush Jr. represented another era in the history of West Africa when the region again 
became a prey to global powers' dictates. President Bush did not mince words when he 
proclaimed what became popularly known as the "Bush Doctrine" in the aftermath of the 
terror attacks. In his speech after the attacks, President Bush cited Niger, a West African 
country as a source of significant quantities of uranium for Saddam Hussein's alleged 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Dockrill, 2006; Jervis, 2003). According to 
Dockrill (2006), the African uranium connection was attributed to Britain's intelligence 
dossier by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council and 
subsequently by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address. The allegation 
was, however, discredited by the International Atomic Agency (IAA) to the UN (as cited 
in Frankel 2003, A15).   
 The IAA rebuff notwithstanding, the West African region did not escape 
becoming another operational theatre for prosecuting the "Bush Doctrine" of the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT). Since the region was tagged and there was no-turning-back 
on already prepared grand strategic plans. Browne (2018) cited the commander of US 
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special operations in Africa, Major General Marcus Hicks, as saying that, "ISIS and al 
Qaeda represent major threats and are growing in strength in West Africa" (Para 1). 
Incidentally, this statement was made in Niger during EXERCISE FLINTLOCK 18, joint 
military counterterrorism operations involving troops from Africa and western countries 
(Para 2).    
 In Akanji (2019), the author analyses ECOWAS’ terrorism experience within the 
context of the post-September 11, mainly Western collaboration with different 
governments in the region in combating the menace. Akanji (2019) also examines the 
strategies employed and the responses of the various actors with a focus on ECOWAS’ 
challenges, especially in most affected countries - Nigeria and Mali. He delved into the 
various ECOWAS initiatives toward conflict management and the regional body's 
collaborative efforts with both regional and international state and non-state actors in 
combatting terrorism (p. 101).  
 According to Akanji (2019), some ECOWAS member states refused to cooperate 
with it in conducting security operations. He also indicates that, member states’ failure to 
honor their financial obligations impacts on effective functioning of the organization's 
security management system. Externally, Akanji attributes ECOWAS’ primary challenge 
to the overbearing influence of the African Union and the United Nations on regional and 
subregional initiatives. The main problem is primarily on decisions on the use of force; 
thus, foreclosing unilateral but timely and critical military interventions (p. 106). 
However, Akanji's attention was on ECOWAS’ internal and external challenges in 
dealing with the problem. Akanji also examines the ECOWAS counterterrorism 
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strategies but within the context of the organization's existing protocols, treaties and 
agreements thereby limiting the scope of the study and consequently, overlooking the 
interrelationships with other threats to the region's security  
 Zimmerer (2019) also tracks the metamorphosis of the conflict in the Sahel 
region of West Africa from the launch of the Post-September 11 War on Terror to the 
period when it became a full-blown terror dominated crisis. Zimmerer described the 
effects of the response from West African security forces, the UN, and the French to the 
conflict as "little discernible progress" with the threat rather growing and becoming more 
complex (p. 1). Zimmerer assesses the relationships among the terrorist groups in the 
region, their intentions and capabilities, external links to Al Qaeda, and the motivations 
for their eventual merger to form a new group called Jama' at Nusrat al-Islam wal 
Muslimin (JNIM). However, because it is also terrorism focused, the study failed to 
appreciate the pre-September 11 security dynamics and, consequently, missed the 
existing conflict undercurrents that have inhibiting/aggravating significances for a 
triangulated analysis of the problem. Thus, apart from the intent and capabilities, the 
inhibiting/aggravating circumstances would have constituted a third factor in the report if 
the study was not skewed toward terrorism.  
 Goerzig (2019) contextualizes the research on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) terrorist group's learning into meso and macro levels influencing factors from 
tactical and strategic perspectives. Goerzig described the "meso-level influences concept 
as cooperation and ultimate merging with Al Qaeda, and macro-level influences as 
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government action" (p. 1). With this, Goerzig posits that the concept of "counterterrorism 
often does not lead to what was intended and instead aggravates problems" (p. 1).  
 In justifying this stand, the author made references to previous counterterrorism 
studies that failed to pose questions on the construct and instead, adopting it, thereby not 
only failing to lead to the intended objectives but also aggravating the problems (p. 1). 
Goerzig argues that violence and radicalization may not necessarily be characterized by 
terrorism, especially in the Islamic Maghreb. She explains that terrorist learning could 
also lead to moderation in their attitude and that, "the sustainable answer to the question 
of the political implication of this is not how to boost counterterrorism measures but how 
to redefine them." (p. 2). While referencing Ranstorp & Normak (2015) and Rasmussen 
and Hafez (2010), Georzig expatiates on terrorists' proclivity to non-escalatory 
innovation when the appropriate conditioning factors are put in place. (p. 3). 
 Several studies have been conducted on the effects of the United States' 
declaration of the (GWOT) on peace and security in West Africa. That notwithstanding, 
the various researchers have, in many cases, focused on terrorism and its associated 
factors or made cursory references to other aspects of the region's peace and security 
dynamics. Each has an area of concentration within its peculiar terrorism and 
counterterrorism narratives in all the literature referenced in this chapter.   
ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture  
The initial ECOWAS treaty of May 1975 made no provision for military 
intervention in interstate and intrastate conflicts among member states. However, 
realizing the need for regional peace and security, the organization entered into various 
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protocols and agreements to deal with problems of insecurity. These include the June 
1977 Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence (ANAD), the April 1978 
Non-Aggression Protocol, and a Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence signed in 
Freetown on May 29, 1981 (Agbu, 2006; ECOWAS, 1999; United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa 2018). These agreements and protocols provided the impetus for 
the initial military intervention operations carried out by the organization in Liberia and 
subsequently, in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Gambia (Agbu, 
2006; ECOWAS, 2015c).  
 Following ECOWAS’ involvement in peace and security matters, it became 
necessary for the organization to structuralize. The structuralization did not only enable 
ECOWAS to leverage its peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacities, but it also 
enhanced its mandate implementation capabilities and operational reach in responding to 
increasing demands from the international community and civil society for 
democratization (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009). Based on its successes and lessons 
learned, ECOWAS decided to move on from its state of an ad-hoc and apparent reactive 
approach to quelling conflict to a more structured approach to managing regional peace 
and security (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009).   
 Consequently, in 1993, as the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone intensified, 
ECOWAS revised its treaty by introducing Article 58 for the establishment of regional 
peace, stability, and security system. The call was for all community members to actively 
participate in the region's peace and security matters to ensure "timely prevention and 
resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts" (ECOWAS, 1993, Art 58). ECOWAS 
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then signed a Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
and Resolution; Peace-keeping; and Security in 1999 to empower the organization "to 
control the flow of small arms and light weapons." (ECOWAS, 1999, Arts. 50 and 51; 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016).   
 Core to the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture is the concept of the Early 
Warning System, also known as the ECOWARN. To give effect to the 1999 ECOWAS 
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security Chapters IV and V of the protocol made 
provisions for an early warning system. While Chapter IV covered the establishment of a 
headquarters based Observation and Monitoring Centre and subregional Observation and 
Monitoring Zones, Chapter V defined the conditions for application, the authority to 
initiate action, and the procedures for implementing the mechanism (ECOWAS, 1999, 
Arts. 23-27). The Early Warning mechanism was established to augment member states' 
alert systems to enable affected countries to identify and provide an initial response to the 
crisis proactively and to also disseminate information swiftly among other member states 
ahead of subregional intervention (IOM, 2016; Wulf & Debiel, 2009; Bashir, 2015). 
ECOWARN, per the 1999 Protocol, established two operational branches that comprised 
an Observation and Monitoring Centre in Abuja, Nigeria, and four-zone offices across the 
subregion. 
     52 
 
 
The zones are as follows: Zone I - Cape Verde, Senegal the Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, and The Gambia with headquarters in Banjul. Zone II - Burkina Faso, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Mali, and Niger, with the office in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Zone III - 
Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, and Sierra Leone has its office in Monrovia, Liberia. 
Zone IV - Benin, Nigeria, and Togo with the headquarters in Cotonou, Benin (Bashir, 
2015; Odobo et al., 2017; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2018). The zonal various observatory groupings and the headquarters-based Monitoring 
Center for the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network are shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Map showing ECOWAS zones for Early Warning and Response Network. 
Note. Adapted from “The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network,” 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/swac/theecowasearlywarningandresponsenetwork.htm 
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The ECOWARN concept looks good on paper and has indeed made a significant 
impact by sounding early alerts of a potential crisis in the subregion like that of Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, and Cote D'Ivoire (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2018; Bashir, 2015; ECOWAS, 2017). However, the anticipated end-state 
for the establishment of ECOWARN as captured in the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol was as 
follows: "a subregional peace and security observation system that will prevent conflict 
under Article 58 of the Revised Treaty" is fraught with challenges (ECOWAS bb 1999, 
Chapter IV, para 1; Odobo et al., 2017; USAID, 2019). The United States government 
has come up with a program for Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West 
Africa (REWARD) as part of its Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP) 
initiative to support ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 2018; USAID, 2019). However, the United 
States' support is in conflict data analysis with a focus on electoral violence in selected 
countries (Niger, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Togo) in the region (USAID, 2019). 
Also significant in ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture was the adoption 
of a Code of Conduct to backstop the implementation of the Moratorium on the 
Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons that was declared in 
October 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria. The Moratorium aimed to "facilitate the resolution of 
violent conflict, enhance peacebuilding measures, step-up arms control, and curb the 
proliferation of light weapons" in the region (ECOWAS 1999; UN, 1999; United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, para 2). ECOWAS established the Program for 
Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) to give effect and 
serve as an enforcement mechanism for the implementation of the Moratorium. The 
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PCASED defined the Code of Conduct and a Plan of Action covering nine thematic areas 
(Ayissi & Sall, 2005).   
From November 30 to December 1, 2000, "the ministers of OAU member states 
met in Bamako, Mali, to develop an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, 
Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons" (African Union Peace 
and Security, 2012; Organization of African Unity, 2000, para 1). This initiative was in 
line with ECOWAS’ acquiescence to other international treaties, protocols, and 
agreements signed by its member states as part of the continental and global 
organizations. For example, the 2000 Bamako Declaration was adopted as a common 
position for ECOWAS and AU under the United Nations Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects (POA) (Alusala, 2017; Olvera, 2013; United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs; 2016). 
 Following recommendations of the 2002 evaluation report of a study conducted 
by independent experts on the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, 
Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons, the regional group in June 2006 
adopted the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their 
Ammunition and Other Related Materials (Berkol, 2007, p. 1; ECOWAS, 2006). This 
convention aimed to make the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and 
Manufacture of Light Weapons a legally binding instrument since there many cases of 
non-compliance by member states due to the voluntary nature of the Moratorium (Berkol, 
2007, p. 1; Coulibaly, 2007, p. 4). 
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 There is no gainsaying about the numerous achievements that have emanated 
from the various agreements, treaties, protocols, and memoranda of understanding 
(Lucey, 2016; Ayissi & Sall, 2005). That notwithstanding, while some of these security 
arrangements have remained mere paper works many of them have only been partially 
implemented (Bolarinwa, 2015 Coulibaly, 2007; Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018, pp 2-6). 
Understandably, there are abundant literature and ECOWAS documents on frameworks 
and agreements on how the security threats in the West African region could be managed. 
However, a perspective on the two-pronged approach to managing the preexisting 
internecine conflicts and the new and emerging threats like terrorism, cyber, and 
organized transnational criminal activities in the region is unexplored. Thus, the nexus 
between the two layers have remained unaddressed while persistent conflicts and the 
emergence of new security threats bedevil the region (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Marc et al., 
2015; UN News, 2019). 
 Okere, (2015), for example, evaluated the ECOWAS conflict management and 
peacekeeping interventions in West Africa to draw lessons for a more robust regional 
peace and security system (p. 30). While he commended ECOWAS’ peacekeeping 
records, he criticized the organization's failure to halt the growing violence in the region. 
He cited "political will to act, political cohesion and clear mandate" as preconditions for 
any successful peacekeeping endeavor (p. 30). He went further to proffer conflict 
prevention as a better and cost-effective approach to conflict management (p. 43). In this 
literature, Okere narrates the various peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions 
ECOWAS has undertaken and concludes that alone is not enough as a strategy and that 
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the region's peace and security landscape remains fragile (p. 42). One major gap in this 
literature is its focus on ECOWAS’ management of security threats posed by the post-
Cold War domestic conflicts while overlooking the new and emerging sources of 
insecurity like terrorism and violent or organized crimes across the region (Berkol, 2007; 
ECOWAS, 2006, pp.6&7).  
 In exploring the security dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Tar and 
Mustapha (2017) assessed the historical, economic, and geopolitical antecedents for the 
formation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and its roles in the region's 
security imperatives. Characteristically, the LCBC's focus has been diverted by the threat 
posed by the Boko Haram terrorist group in the area. While referencing Kagwanja 
(2006), Tar and Mustapha (2017) asserted that the LCBC's war on Boko Haram 
insurgents in the LCB region could be described as an extension of the US-led global war 
on terror (p. 100). Tar and Mustapha lauded the efforts of the LCBC's Multinational Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF is a politico-military entity that has the blessing of the 
African Union's Peace and Security Council to support other supranational and regional 
organizations on the continent (p. 109).  
Tar and Mustapha (2017) referred to Chapter Eight of the United Nations Charter 
as a provision that empowers regional organizations to act to deal with security 
challenges confronting them. He also highlighted the importance of local bodies' take-
over of security roles to fill the gap left by the United Nations' inability to address that 
deficit, (p. 100). Chapter Eight, of the United Nations Charter, specifically provides that:   
     57 
 
 
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements 
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided 
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations (Article 52, para 1). 
Tar and Mustapha identified the importance of a comprehensive security 
framework as a viable option for addressing regional security issues. However, their 
focus on political engagements and deployment of "more boots on the ground" left socio-
economic factors and the roles of many stakeholders like civil society groups and think-
tanks out of the equation (p. 115; Alagappa, 1995). Besides, the much-eulogized MNJTF 
in the literature has rather weakened the resolve of more experienced and formidable 
ECOWAS in dealing with the threat. Thus, even though the formation of LCBC allowed 
for better focusing, the MNJTF superfluously overlaps regional efforts, thereby allowing 
the problem to fester.    
Summary 
This chapter began by establishing the literature search strategy and then went 
straight to the primary research questions of this study. The chapter also established the 
gaps in the various literature discussed. Additionally, the chapter revealed the inherent 
weaknesses of the reviewed literature in dealing with the problem within a context of 
relevant themes with due consideration to the primary research questions of this study. 
 Chapter two also emphasized the need for centralizing the two layers of threats to 
peace and security ECOWAS’ analytical process. The conceptual framework 
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underpinning the study was the PET and PFT. While the application of PET will create 
adequate space for an in-depth analysis of the two layers of threats and integration of 
divergent viewpoints, the PTF allows for the study of interrelated concepts and 
synchronization of alternative options. 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In conducting this study, I sought to explore the Economic Community of West 
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to regional security management in West Africa. 
ECOWAS has undertaken both diplomatic and military strategies to address conflicts in 
the region with significant success. Due to changes in global security dynamics, West 
Africa is confronted with an additional layer of the threat posed by terrorism, cybercrime, 
and organized transnational and cross-border crimes (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015).  
ECOWAS’ strategy of conventional military deployment and mediation had been 
effective in the past (Akokpari, 2016). Yet, the regional body is astounded by rising 
threat levels (Marc et al., 2015). This phenomenon could be attributable to ECOWAS’ 
failure to engrain the interventions in a detailed assessment of the complex interactions 
between the two layers of security threats in the region (New Jersey Office of Homeland 
Security and Preparedness, 2018). I applied the qualitative method to explore the threat 
interconnectedness and its impacts on the region’s security.  
I restate the RQs in this chapter and also justify the methodology. In addition, I 
describe the recruitment procedure for the research participants and the data collection 
and analysis techniques that were applied. I also discuss my role as a researcher and show 
how I addressed ethical concerns and issues regarding credibility, trustworthiness, and 
protection of participants. 
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Research Design and Rationale  
The overall question for the research was, how effective is ECOWAS’ current 
approach to security management in the region?  The other RQs were as follows: 
RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security 
problems that confront the region?    
RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its scheme of 
conflict management strategy?  
This research involved a nuanced study of ECOWAS’ security threat strategy vis-
à-vis the two layers of threats confronting the West African region. According to 
Creswell (2009), although the primary research methods are qualitative, quantitative and 
mixed approaches, researchers are influenced by their worldview in which one to choose. 
Motivated by the constructivist worldview, I was able to draw from my varied 
experiences in managing security issues at national, regional, and global levels to drive 
the study (see Petersen, & Gencel, 2013).  Considering the complexities and multiplicity 
of the study, my constructivist worldview enhanced my understanding of the 
phenomenon as the study progresses (see Adom, Yeboah, & Ankrah, 2016). 
I used the qualitative approach with grounded theory. The qualitative approach 
enabled me to explore the various perspectives of practitioners, subject matter experts, 
and peace and security institutions across the region regarding the problem (Creswell, 
2013; Yin, 2016). The study was an exploratory case study based on a formative 
evaluation research methodology.   
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The study began with an exploration of the prevailing security situation among 
member states to establish the current threats profile and the region's vulnerabilities to 
them. ECOWAS architecture and strategies for the management of its members' security 
were subjected to formative evaluation to assess their inherent challenges as well as the 
effectiveness and efficacy of their implementation process. This approach helps security 
practitioners to harmonize the various national doctrines for conflict management 
strategies to be using existing best practices. This approach enhances researchers’ ability 
to proffer alternative strategies and contextualize aspects of social value (Kozleski, 
2017). 
Role of the Researcher 
Researchers are considered as instruments, especially in qualitative studies, 
because of their intricate roles in data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Chenail, 
2011; Creswell, 2013; Turato, 2005). These characteristics manifest in how researchers' 
backgrounds, interests, and values influence their recruitment of participants, the options 
they consider, and the decisions they make at each stage in shaping the study (Creswell, 
2014; Fink, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). Sutton and Austin (2015), citing 
Strauss and Corbin, indicated that, unlike quantitative research, the qualitative approach 
enables researchers to have a better appreciation of the "hows" and "whys" of the 
phenomenon, particularly during in-depth interviews. 
As the researcher, I had the responsibility of deciding on the data types and 
sources employed in this study. I also chose the methods of analysis applied, where to lay 
emphasis, and the angle of interpretation to give to the data. All these circumstances 
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made me susceptible to inherent bias, which I made a concerted effort to mitigate and, 
where possible, avoid altogether (see Sutton, & Austin, 2015). As a qualitative 
researcher, I acknowledged my sociocultural circumstances as a citizen of West Africa 
and my military, UN security, and peacekeeping backgrounds, which could potentially 
shape my worldview and perspectives on the region’s security matters generally. 
Throughout the research process, I strove to minimize the effects of those biases on the 
credibility of the data analysis, findings, and conclusions of the study. 
Methodology 
Participant Selection Logic 
The setting for this research was in West Africa, a diverse region with English, 
French, and Portuguese as national languages among the various countries. ECOWAS is 
represented proportionately by its member states regarding population size and other 
internal democratic mechanisms. In qualitative research, sample size and multiple 
sourcing are vital in collecting and analyzing data (Creswell, 2013; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 
2016). 
I selected participants from KAIPTC, the ECOWAS headquarters, the WANEP 
office, and the Nigerian National Defense College (NDC) in Abuja, Nigeria. Both 
KAIPTC and WANEP are known industry players in regional security in the region. I 
selected participants from the two institutions to obtain their perspectives. I also recruited 
participants to reflect the national languages of countries in the region. I did so by 
ensuring that members from countries across the various lingua franca, regional peace, 
and security institutions and think tanks were involved in the data collection process. 
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A qualitative study calls for continuous refocusing and redrawing of study 
parameters during fieldwork (Miles et al., 2014). Emmel (2013) also asserted that 
qualitative sampling as a process will require the researcher to make a series of implied 
decisions that could necessitate making adjustments along the way. In line with Shank 
(2002) and Patton (2012), I applied the nonprobability sampling technique in choosing 
participants for data collection. I used the purposive sampling technique to create a quota 
system in recruiting members for the various aspects of the data collection. 
I anticipated having at least 20% female participants to ensure a reasonably 
balanced gender representation and perspectives; however, I attained 16.7%. The 
participants comprised practitioners at the ECOWAS headquarters at Abuja, Nigeria, 
security experts, practitioners, and think tanks from the region's peace and security 
institutions in Ghana and Nigeria. The criteria ensured diversity and the triangulation of 
data collected and facilitated a comprehensive analysis of the problem.   
Unlike the quantitative method, which places much premium on sample size for 
statistical significance, qualitative research does not emphasize the importance of a large 
sample size in determining the validity and reliability of the research findings (Merriam, 
2009). Marshal (1996) emphasized taking a cue from the RQs in deciding on the 
appropriate size of a sample for a qualitative study (p. 523), while Yin (2016) and 
Creswell (2013) asserted that the sample size must equally reflect the purpose and goal of 
the study. I made provision for approximately 15 participants in all: 10 primary 
participants with room for an additional five participants to contain the snowball effect. I, 
however, interviewed a total of 12 participants; once I attained the data saturation point, I 
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ended the interview process and shifted efforts to the collection of documents to 
triangulate the process. 
I conducted interviews with practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in 
Abuja, Nigeria. I used face-to-face, in-depth interviews to seek Intellectual perspectives 
on the phenomenon from the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana. Also, subject matter experts at 
WANEP offices in Nigeria and Ghana were interviewed to assess the vulnerabilities of 
the region within the context of the threats. The in-depth interviews also created 
platforms to evaluate the perspectives of academia, practitioners, and subject matter 
experts concerning the existing and new and emerging threats in the region. 
Instrumentation 
The choice of appropriate instruments facilitates focusing on the research 
objectives and also enhances the data collection and analysis process (Trigueros, Juan, & 
Sandoval, 2017).  Three main data collection instruments were used in this study. These 
comprised the application of interview protocol, documents, and I as the researcher. This 
combination of instrumentation brought about the convergence and corroboration of data 
needed to enhance triangulation and confluence of evidence (Bowen, 2009).  
The interview protocol application enables the researcher to conduct an in-depth 
exploratory within the context of the research purpose and questions to enhance the 
quality of responses (Yin, 2016; Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). I adopted what Castillo-
Montoya (2016) proffered as a four-phase Interview Protocol Refinement (IPR) process:   
“Phase 1: Ensuring interview questions align with research questions,  
Phase 2: Constructing an inquiry-based conversation, 
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Phase 3: Receiving feedback on interview protocols  
Phase 4: Piloting the interview protocol.” (p.812).    
I followed the four-phase IPR for both face-to-face and telephone interviews to 
enhance the interview protocol's reliability and, consequently, improve the quality of the 
interview data (p.811; Jacob & Furgerson, 2012; Trigueros, Juan, & Sandoval, 2017). 
Document analysis will form a significant aspect of my data collection. According to 
Bowen (2009), documents are interpreted to give voice and meaning to the data. Frey 
(2018) adds to the importance of document analysis in arriving at answers to specific 
research questions. I used the following eight-step process offered by O’Leary as cited by 
Triad (2016) to guide the document analysis: 
1. Gather relevant texts. 
2. Develop an organization and management scheme. 
3. Make copies of the originals for annotation. 
4. Asses authenticity of documents. 
5. Explore the document's agenda, biases.  
6. Explore background information (e.g., tone, style, purpose). 
7. Ask questions about the document (e.g., who produced it? why? when? type of 
data?).  
8. Explore content.  
Due to the semi-structured of the study’s interview process, I, as the researcher, 
also was a major instrument. Considering myself as an instrument enabled me to be 
continuously conscious of my potential biases during the data collection (Pezalla, 
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Pettigrew, & Miller-Day, 2012). I also recognized the central role I play in selecting 
documents, respondents, venues, and the amount of time to apportion to each data 
collection exercise (Xu & Storr, 2012; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 
2016). 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
I commenced participants’ recruitment for the study upon obtaining the Walden 
University Institutional Research Board approval. I applied purposive sampling with a 
snowballing technique for selecting participants (Maxwell, 2012; Biernack & Waldorf, 
2013). I used purposive sampling to create a quota system to allocate at least 20 percent 
of the participants to women to ensure diverse gender perspectives; however, I achieved 
16.7 percent. 
I started by recruiting my research assistants in Nigeria and Ghana, who partnered 
me to coordinate the interview schedules. Interview venues were the ECOWAS 
Commission in Abuja and the KAIPTC in Accra. I sent e-mails to the various institutions 
for the conduct of the interviews to arrange for contact persons, as well as my preference 
in the participants (male, female, and linguistic backgrounds) and possible use of 
facilities. Appendix B contains the invitation letter sent to participants.   
 I obtained participants’ consent, discussed confidentiality issues, and followed 
my interview protocols to address ethical concerns. There were no payments made to 
participants. I, however, made honorarium available as a gesture to participants where it 
did not contravene the participants' values or their institution's code of ethics (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009; Creswell, 2013). 
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Data Analysis Plan 
The data I collected were primarily electronically recorded interviews and 
documents. Field notes and data were gathered from follow-ups on interviews and used 
informal discussions to gather supplementary data to fill gaps during the analysis. I used 
the NVivo qualitative software to extrapolate themes, subthemes, and sub-subthemes for 
the analysis. The Nvivo software, also known as the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS), helped me to organize and analyze the audio files 
(Creswell 2013). 
Issues of Trustworthiness  
Credibility 
Patton (2015) describes credibility as an analog of internal validity. He explains 
that, even though the construct (internal validity) may not meet the rigorous standard for 
establishing causality in a qualitative approach as it does in quantitative/experimental 
designs, causal analysis can generate the hypothesis (p 601). The broader latitude for 
subjectivity in qualitative research tends to create a condition for dilution of the 
credibility of the study. A lot then hinge on the researcher, as an overbearing instrument 
to be rigorous and thorough in the conduct of fieldwork to establish the credibility of the 
study (Patton, 2015, p.15). I used the nonprobability sampling method of data collection 
by applying purposive sampling with a snowballing technique in a qualitative research 
methodology, which I consider appropriate for enhancing the credibility of this study 
(Burkholder, Cox, & Crawford, 2016).   
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 I also adhere to the requisite protocols laid down by Walden University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB)'s approval for the study regarding participants' 
evaluation, instrumentation, and data evaluation and interpretation (Yin, 2016; Kvale & 
Brinkman, 2009). I further deepened the study's credibility through triangulation by 
employing diverse data collection sources like in-depth interviews, field notes, and 
document analysis (Creswell, 2014). 
Transferability 
Issues of transferability in qualitative research, according to Ravitch & Carl 
(2016), deal with "how qualitative studies can apply or transferable to broader contexts 
while still maintaining their context-specific richness" (p.189). They postulate that "the 
primacy placed on fidelity to participants' experiences in qualitative research makes it 
pertinent to note the exclusive and contextual nature of findings" (p. 189). Nonetheless, 
citing Guba (1981), Ravitch & Carl (2016) maintain that the concept of transferability 
and the parallel notion of external validity can be attained through the provision of 
adequate information and descriptions of data to allow cross-contextualization based on 
available factors (pp. 188-189). Apart from providing a detailed description of the data, I 
applied the purposive sampling technique. The technique enhanced transferability by 
placing the data in context (DeVault, 2017).  
Dependability 
Miles et al. (2014) consider dependability as "the consistency and stability of the 
study over time". Dependability in qualitative study refers to the stability of the data and 
is similar to the quantitative concept of reliability (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
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In ensuring dependability, I explicitly described my role and status as a researcher, fine-
tuned my research questions, and aligned them with the design. I also subjected the study 
to peer review (Miles et al., 2014). Besides, I shared relevant portions of the data with 
participants for their review and responses to ensure accuracy. I then streamlined the 
interpretation and analysis for further review by subject matter experts in the industry and 
institutions in Nigeria, Ghana, and the United States. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability seeks to establish adequate objectivity in a research environment 
where the researcher's personal bias does not overshadow the respondents' experiences 
and preferences (Moon et al., 2016; Ravitch, & Carl, 2016). In this study, I realized that 
my background as a West African and a security scholar-practitioner at KAIPTC and in 
United Nations peacekeeping could generate some issues of positionality and 
philosophical perspectives and made an effort to address those (Moon et al., 2016). 
Therefore, I have provided a vivid account of the various processes I applied to address 
potential biases. I correctly identified those concerning my epistemological and 
ontological preferences. I also established trustworthiness by subjecting the study to peer 
review by experts and even through the Walden University's rigorous auditing of the 
findings to ensure their consistency with data collected and aligned with the 
interpretations and conclusions.  
Ethical Procedures 
This study explored sensitive areas concerning doctrines and strategies ECOWAS 
is employing to manage security in West Africa. There was a high likelihood of ethical 
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issues coming up during the research. I sought participants’ informed consent and 
instituted measures to safeguard their anonymity to ensure that their job security 
jeopardizes by their participation in the study. I assigned each participant a nickname and 
a number to cover their tracks (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). I also instituted measures that 
enabled the set-limits and confidentiality for participants to be respected and their safety 
ensured by agreeing with them on a convenient time and venue that suited them for their 
interviews. (Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, Shoghi, & Cheraghi, 2014). In this case, I 
provided participants adequate information regarding the project, how their input was to 
be recorded and used, alerted them of their rights of withdrawal at any time from the 
process, and got them to sign consent forms.    
 I applied the grounded theory to this study. The implication was that I was 
intricately involved in every stage of the research process. I was mindful of my 
prejudices as a researcher and, thus, made a conscious effort to avoid unduly bringing my 
influence to bear on the study by upholding a high ethical standard throughout. I sought 
for IRB clearance and guidance at the various stages research process. I also applied for 
approval from the Walden University Ethics Committee to authenticate the process. 
Approvals from national ethics committees of countries where I interviewed the 
participants (Ghana and Nigeria) were unnecessary. To further ensure adherence to 
ethical standards, I requested reviews from other researchers with varied backgrounds to 
equip me with alternate viewpoints as the study progressed.  




The ECOWAS’ security management framework had been successful in 
containing the threat of armed conflicts in the region until the inception of additional 
threats of terrorism, cybercrime, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes in 
the region (Marc et al., 2015). The regional organization's security management strategy 
lacks a detailed assessment of the complex relationships between the two layers of 
security threats in the region (New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 
2018).  
 This chapter justifies my choice of a qualitative approach to explore the 
interconnectedness of the two layers of security threat to contributing to ECOWAS’ 
regional security strategy. I have given details of my data sampling and collection 
strategy and also indicated my justification for the selection criteria for respondents. 
Furthermore, I have stated how I addressed ethical, trustworthiness, and participants' 
protection issues (Creswell, 2014). In chapter 4, I explained what data were collected and 
analyzed to answer the research questions. 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West 
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to regional security management in West Africa . 
This study was necessary because of the continuous deterioration of the security situation 
in West Africa; the ECOWAS security management approach remains ineffective 
(Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015). I conducted interviews to elicit the perspectives of 
12 participants comprising security management practitioners, subject matter experts, and 
research academicians.  
The research proffers an alternative security management framework for 
ECOWAS in its regional security approach for West Africa. The results provided a basis 
for fashioning an operational framework for a synchronized threat management 
architecture that ECOWAS headquarters, in collaboration with subject matter experts and 
institutions of excellence, could further expound as part of measures for addressing the 
persistent security problems in the region. The study is also replicable by other regional 
and continental organizations seeking to expand their security management strategies. 
In this chapter, I discuss the research setting, participants' demographics, data 
collection process, and data analysis. I provide evidence of trustworthiness using 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability constructs. I then present the 
interview results and findings thematically and provide a summary of the chapter at the 
end. 




I researched ECOWAS headquarters and selected key security institutions in West 
Africa. ECOWAS headquarters and WANEP head office have staff members across the 
subregion. ECOWAS is the regional organization that manages regional security in West 
Africa and is represented proportionately by its member states regarding population size 
and other internal democratic mechanisms. The WANEP is a peacebuilding organization 
that has national networks with over 500 member organizations across the region. 
KAIPTC is a regional institution of excellence that conducts academic research on 
security issues in West Africa. The Nigerian NDC is the highest echelon military training 
institution and a Centre of Excellence for strategic-level training for peace support 
operations in West Africa. Therefore, I collected data directly from the natural settings in 
Ghana and Nigeria, where these institutions operate. This approach allowed me to focus 
on making meaning from the participants’ viewpoints within their environment.  
I recruited three Francophone and two Anglophone participants at the ECOWAS 
headquarters to reflect the region’s sociocultural dynamics generally. The purposeful 
selection was to ensure adequate representation of participants from countries across the 
two dominant lingua franca in West Africa.  Regional peace and security institutions and 
think tanks were also engaged to provide perspectives external to ECOWAS headquarters 
in the data collection process. 
Demographics 
I interviewed 12 participants comprising five security management practitioners 
from ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, two subject matter experts from 
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WANEP headquarters in Accra, Ghana, and one at WANEP country office in Abuja, 
Nigeria. I interviewed three research academicians from KAIPTC and, based on 
recommendation, went further with one participant from the NDC. Interviewees 
comprised 33.3% military and 66.7% civilian staff in total from the various institutions, 
which, based on their backgrounds, provided diverse angles to the problem. The 
participant pool also comprised 66.7% Francophones and 33.3% Anglophones across the 
region. No Lusophone was available for an interview due to unavailability. The study 
targeted not less than 20% of female participation. However, I achieved 16.7% female 
participation. 
Most of the participants (58%) had doctorates, while 33% and 8% were masters 
and bachelor degree holders, respectively. I also realized that 75% of respondents had 
worked for more than five years with their various institutions. Participants' depth of 
knowledge, experience, and diverse gender and geopolitical backgrounds provided more 
profound insight into the phenomenon. Still, they also widened the spectrum of data 
analysis and nuanced interpretation of results.  I assigned each participant a nickname to 
ensure confidentiality. Detailed demographic characteristics of respondents are shown in 
Table 2.




Table 2  
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 
Description Frequency Percentage Valid percentage Cumulative percentage 
Lingua Franca 
French 4 33.3 33.3 33.3 
English 8 66.7 66.7 100 
Portuguese 0 0 0 100 
Professional status 
Military 4 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Civilian 8 66.7 66.7 100 
Length of service with institutions 
0-5 years 3 25 25 25 
6-10 years 3 25 25 50 
11-15 years 5 41.6 41.6 91.6 
16-20 years 1 8.4 41.6 100 
Academic background 
Bachelors 1 8.4 8.4 8.4 
Masters 4 33.3 33.3 41.7 
Doctorate 7 58.3 58.3 100 
Gender 
Female 2 16.7 16.7 16.7 
Male 10 83.3 83.3 100 





I applied a stratified sampling method with purposive sampling and snowball data 
collection techniques using in-depth interviews, field notes, and document analysis to 
gather data for this study. Participants were stratified to get perspectives from industry 
practitioners, think tanks/subject matter experts, and academia. Hence, participants were 
purposefully selected among practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, 
think tanks/subject matter experts from WANEP, and academic researchers from 
KAIPTC. Upon recommendation, two more participants from the ECOWAS Commission 
and an academic researcher from the NDC were also interviewed in concurrence with the 
snowball technique.  
I had each participant sign a consent form after explaining the purpose of the 
study and intended social change. Although nine (75%) respondents instantaneously 
volunteered to participate, three (25%) needed up to two days to declare their consent. I 
scheduled dates and locations for the interviews with the participants and also made them 
aware of their rights to opt out of the exercise at any time they wished. I retrieved each 
participant’s completed consent forms before I conducted the interviews.  
At the beginning of each interview, I verified each participant’s identity, 
introduced myself, and restated the purpose of the research and the social change I sought 
to achieve. I then thanked each of them for participating in the study and reiterated 
interviewees' rights and confidentiality as contained in their completed consent form. I 
also requested participants' consent to use a voice recorder for the interview with further 
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confidentiality guarantees. I explained that I intended to ensure that I captured their 
responses accurately for data analysis. 
After agreeing to set terms, attaining consents, and establishing that respondents 
were comfortable with the process, I discussed the interview protocol and research 
questions with them. I alerted participants when I wanted to start recording before 
commencing the interviews. Two participants objected to being recorded but agreed to 
notes taking. The recorded interviews lasted between 25 and 30 minutes, while those that 
declined recording were between 45 and 60 minutes. The interviews were conducted in a 
relaxed atmosphere to enable participants to freely express their thoughts, provide their 
expertise, and share their experiences on each question. I asked follow-on questions when 
needed for clarification, eliciting further information, and getting respondents on track. 
At the end of the interviews, I thanked participants and agreed to get back to them 
whenever necessary. 
I transcribed the interviews, printed hard copies, and filed the information 
hierarchically in separate Microsoft word documents in identifiable folders. I reviewed 
the transcripts for coherence and flow and then extracted themes and analyzed the 
content, using the NVivo 12 transcripts. I backed-up each file on a separate pen-drive. I 
then duplicated all the data on an external hard-drive as a second level back-up to ensure 
the protection of the documents from possible losses and malicious software attacks. I 
then locked-up the hard and electronic copies of the data in a safe that only I can access. 
Additional access control protocols I used for the soft copies included passwords and 
identification questions to ensure that only I can access the files. 
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Although I anticipated that some data collection challenges like getting the 
relevant staff for the interview, some heads of departments' failure to respond to formal 
Letters of Cooperation requests for data collection substantially stalled the process. There 
was a particular case in which my phone calls, getting proximate representatives to 
follow-up, and even sending WhatsApp messages were unsuccessful. Nonetheless, I 
received warm reception and cooperation upon traveling to the various offices to have a 
face to face talks on the project with them. I also received a lot of staff who volunteered 
to participate. The passion and zeal of interviewees from the ECOWAS Commission 
were particularly noticeable during the data collection exercise. 
Data Analysis 
I used NVivo 12 software to transcribe the audio data gathered from the 
interviews into text. I then did a thorough perusal of the transcripts to understand the 
meaning and flow of the sentences to have a better appreciation of participants' 
perspectives. I further matched each interview with my field notes and related documents 
I collected. Subsequently, I integrated the entire data and conducted in-depth, line-by-line 
scrutiny to ensure coherence and to help me ascertain the central themes.   
 An overarching question on the effectiveness of ECOWAS' current regional 
security management approach inspired data collection. That was followed by two 
supporting questions regarding ECOWAS' preparedness and challenges as research 
questions 2 and 3, respectively. However, all three interview questions were 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing in attaining the purpose of the study. The three 
RQs were as follows:  
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RQ1. How effective is ECOWAS’ current approach to security management in 
the region? 
RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security 
problems that confront the region? 
RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme 
of conflict management strategy? 
I conducted another level of search and synthesis of the interview and 
documentary data to identify themes and subthemes in consonance with the three 
research questions. I subsequently evaluated the results to establish the main themes, 
subthemes, and sub-Subthemes before appropriately segregating and classifying them for 
the analysis. In all, I found five main themes, 14 subthemes, and two sub-subthemes. I 
identified "Coordination" as a crosscutting construct and has been sub and sub-
subthemed across all the main themes. I conducted intertextual triangulation of the data 
(interviews, field notes, and documents) to capture the diverse perspectives. I reviewed 
the data's findings and then related them to the themes and the research questions as part 
of the data analysis process. A summary of the main themes, subthemes, and sub 
subthemes is shown in Table 3.  




Table 3  
Summary of the Main Themes and Subthemes 
RQ Main theme Subthemes Sub-subthemes 
RQ1 Theme: 1 Effectiveness 
of ECOWAS 
a. Successful interventions 
b. Unsuccessful interventions 
c. Involvement of CSOs 
Nil 
Theme 2: Integrated 
Threat Management 
a. Integrated approach 
b. Coordination mechanisms 
Nil 
RQ2 Theme 3: ECOWAS’ 
Preparedness 
a. Force generation 
b. Decentralization of national response 
mechanism 
c. Lack of supranational sanctioning 
instrument 
d. Coordination mechanisms 
Nil 
Theme 4: ECOWAS 
Peace and Security 
Architecture 
a. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
Framework 
b. Early warning mechanisms 
c. ECOWAS Standby Force 
Nil 
RQ3 Theme 5: Mandate 
Implementation 
Challenges 
a. Nonadherence to existing agreements 
and protocols 
b. Funding 
c. External interference 
                                     
i. Direct interference 
ii. Indirect interference 




I collated all responses to each RQ from all the 12 participants and attached their 
associated field notes, related documentary support, and references; and saved them in 
separate folders. I then named the envelopes as "Research Question One," "Research 
Question Two," and "Research Question Three." Afterward, I scrutinized each RQ folder 
to identify common phrases and key-words-in-contexts. As part of my technique for a 
search for missing information, I also included “integrated threat management” as part of 
follow-on questions to delve deeper into interviewees’ understanding of the security 
management process.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness  
Credibility 
I applied the purposeful stratified sampling method with a snowball data 
collection technique to ensure the credibility of the data collected. The purposeful 
stratified sampling method enabled me to collect data in the form of interviews that came 
from key industry players in security management in West Africa. Thus, I purposefully 
recruited higher caliber knowledgeable and experienced security professionals from 
established institutions in the region for the interviews. In applying this criterion, I 
attained the following results:   
a. Seventy-five percent of respondents have worked for more than five years with 
their various institutions.  
b. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents were Ph.D., 33% Masters, and 8% 
Bachelor’s degree holders. 
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I went further to adopted two levels of triangulation to establish confidence in the 
truth of the results and to enhance my attainment of a broad understanding of the 
phenomenon and comprehensive and well-developed research findings. The first level of 
triangulation I used was through stratification of data sampling sources into academia, 
subject matter experts, and practitioners. Therefore, I selected a key regional security 
institution, each among the academia (KAIPTC and later added the NDC), subject matter 
experts (WANEP), and practitioners (ECOWAS) for data collection. Secondly, I applied 
a multiple-source data approach where I utilized interview data, field notes, and materials 
from the various institutions and open sources.  
Transferability 
The study focuses on the management of security problems by a regional bloc in 
Africa ECOWAS. Apart from the African Union, this study is replicable in other 
subregional bodies like the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community 
(EAC), and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Consequently, I have provided detailed 
background and contextual information that prompted the study and the step-by-step 
procedures I followed in conducting the research. Even though the research primarily 
dealt with regional security issues in West Africa, security managers worldwide can 
adapt it to suit their security settings.  
Confirmability 
I aimed at ensuring a high degree of neutrality in the findings for this study. 
Therefore, before data collection, I tabulated a checklist of researcher and interviewer 
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biases that could potentially skew the findings. I used multiple data sources, open-ended 
question techniques, follow-on questions, and getting participants to review the results of 
their responses. I also maintained field notes that contained my reflections on each 
research setting and the traits and mannerisms of respondents throughout the data 
collection process. 
Dependability 
I began ensuring dependability by following standards set by the IRB at each 
stage research process. Besides, I applied the Walden University Ethics Committee's 
recommendations and audit techniques for establishing dependability in the study. I 
further sought peer reviews from other researchers with a diverse academic and 
institutional background to equip me with alternate perspectives to guarantee 
dependability as the study progressed. I also provided a vivid description of the processes 
involved in the study to enable future researchers to replicate identical studies in other 
subregions or at the continental level and still yield similar results.  
Results 
In this chapter, I analyzed the results of 12 interviews and reviewed documents 
from the data gathered. I used the NVivo software to cluster and organize the interview 
data, excerpts of documentary materials, and the field notes into five themes, 14 
subthemes, and two sub-subthemes. I applied a thematic analysis framework to review 
the main themes and subthemes to answer an overarching question regarding ECOWAS' 
effectiveness and two supporting questions relating to the organization’s preparation and 
implementation challenges in its current approach to security management in the region. 
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Adopting the thematic analysis framework enabled me to deal with crosscutting thematic 
discussions that overlapped the research questions. While I guarantee participant's 
anonymity, I also take ultimate responsibility for the analytical exercise and 
interpretations expatiated in the themes and subthemes that emanated from their 
(participants’) shared knowledge, experiences, and perspectives in this study. 
Research Question 1 
RQ1: How effective is ECOWAS’ current approach to security management in 
the region? I identified a total of two main themes, and six subthemes in RQ1. Each 
theme has three subthemes. Theme 1 - "effectiveness of ECOWAS" had the following 
subthemes: successful interventions, unsuccessful interventions, and involvement of 
CSOs. Theme 2 was "integrated threat management." Theme 2 had the following 
subthemes: threat integration, the framework for threat integration, and coordination 
mechanisms. 
Theme 1: Effectiveness of ECOWAS. The question on the degree of 
effectiveness of ECOWAS generated different responses from respondents. Perspectives 
picked regarding the organization's effectiveness in security management during the 
interviews centered on how successful, or unsuccessful ECOWAS interventions had 
been, and the involvement of regional and subregional groups and Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs). 
Successful interventions. Respondents also varied in their understanding of what 
constitutes success from which to assess ECOWAS' effectiveness. While some 
considered success from the end-state viewpoint, others looked at the processes. 
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Participant 9's comments on the effectiveness of ECOWAS operations were from a 
lifesaving perspective. He conceded that "although ECOWAS had stuttering beginning 
regarding the organization's failure to secure UN assent before it intervened in Liberia, 
many people would have lost their livelihoods.  Also, the UN assenting to the mission 
later indicates ECOWAS' proactivity." Participant 11 saw ECOWAS as very effective, 
considering the frameworks and the mileage it has gained in its integrated multi-
stakeholder approach to get things done. According to Participant 7, "ECOWAS is 
among the most successful organizations in terms of its leadership in sustaining relative 
regional stability." He added, "Yes, the organization might have some challenges with 
terrorism and related issues; we must also appreciate the strategies, frameworks, and 
plans of action ECOWAS has crafted and pushing to get them through under the 
prevailing circumstances." 
Participant 5 assessed ECOWAS’ effectiveness mainly from the angle of the 
organization’s successes in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and diplomatic 
engagements and sustaining democracy. He expressed worry about narratives that seek to 
suggest ECOWAS had not been successful. He admitted institutional challenges but also 
asked the following rhetorical question: “What do you imagine the security situation 
would have been in West Africa without ECOWAS?” The following comment from him 
is also significant:  
Pick ECOMOG, for instance, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts, 
ECOMOG did a lot of good work in these countries till the UN came in. Take 
Cote D'Ivoire; I think ECOMOG was part of the force that went in earlier in 
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support of the UN, and now we see Cote D'Ivoire enjoying a semblance of peace. 
Also, look at the recent situation in The Gambia; ECOMOG went in timely, and 
in conjunction with diplomatic engagement, President Yahya Jammeh was 
compelled into exile to pave the way for the president-elect to be sworn-in.   
Participant 10's position on the theme is that ECOWAS is primarily an 
intergovernmental organization with the remit to coordinate and facilitate member states' 
affairs. He, therefore, thought ECOWAS should be held responsible for implementation 
failures. He espoused that, "Just like UN or any other Inter-Governmental Organization… 
most of the things that it (ECOWAS) does, it does with either the concurrence or with the 
support with member states." Participant 7 expressed a similar opinion when he said: 
"Everything done at the headquarters emanates from the member states." Like Participant 
10 and Participant 7, Participant 9 made the same point with the following allegory: "The 
ECOWAS Commission is like a vehicle with member states as joint car owners and 
drivers; they maintain the vehicle, determine where to go and at which speed." 
Unsuccessful interventions. Similar to the successful intervention subtheme, 
respondents pointed out that ECOWAS was not successful to some extent in its 
management of regional security interventions. Several comments made in this subtheme 
centered on the new and emerging threats to security in the region. These included 
ECOWAS’ handling of the Boko Haram terror crisis, the terror crisis in the Sahel and 
Maghreb regions of West Africa, the thriving transnational organized crime, and 
cybercrime in the region. 
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While explaining probable reasons for ECOWAS’ inability to manage the Boko 
Haram terror crisis in the region well, Participant 10 stated that the AU came in with the 
MNJTF because the crisis transcended ECOWAS boundaries into The Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Participant 9, on the other hand, stated 
that: "Not only MNJTF must ECOWAS be concerned about; but also, the presence 
LCBC, and G5 Sahel in the region that has bred unnecessary rivalry and completion for 
preponderance among the various groups; each of which claims to be fighting terrorism."  
Participant 4 was rather straightforward on the matter when she stated: "You see that 
ECOWAS has not been very effective in dealing with the threats because there were 
other stakeholders who have multiple interests." 
Participant 6 expressed disappointment that "Despite ECOWAS' initial successes 
in its application of 'carrots and stick' strategy; in other words, combining diplomacy with 
the use of force, the organization is gradually losing steam."  He explained that: 
Take the crisis in Guinea Bissau, for example. The ECOWAS Mission in Guinea 
Bissau (ECOMIB) presence in that country was to acts as a strong deterrent, 
dissuading any military intervention and providing a safe and secure environment. 
Although the country has not exploded, if you go to Guinea Bissau, there is chaos. 
So sometimes, the success of ECOWAS in some of the member states depends on 
the context. 
Involvement of regional and subregional groups and CSOs. All the 
interviewees acknowledged the peace and security roles played by CSOs in West Africa. 
Participant 5 stated that "ECOWAS depends so much on the CSOs for expertise in 
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human security. They also rely on the CSOs' ability to reach remote areas in the region 
for information and sensitization programs." He placed his opinion in context with the 
statement below.   
I will say that there have been ups and downs in the effectiveness of the 
ECOWAS security management strategy in West Africa. For instance, when we 
look at ECOWAS engagement with civil society organizations, it is clear that they 
provide many decisive indicators for determining the type of mission to be 
launched. For example, when planning for an intervention, the question of 
whether the organization should carry out political, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement missions, or any of those will be required to be addressed. These are 
critical decisions, and the CSOs' inputs reflect the reality on the ground. 
Participant 6 indicated that the involvement of CSOs is so vital to ECOWAS' 
effective security management. Therefore, he called on ECOWAS to "increase its 
engagement with the CSOs, especially from the planning stage through implementation 
to monitoring and evaluation." He cited the "grassroots" roles played by CSOs in support 
of ECOMOG, especially during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. Participant 6, 
however, indicated that: 
The CSOs have challenges in generating funds from the region. A substantial 
component of their funding comes from other organizations outside the region, 
which might have their interest and agenda they might be pushing. These can drag 
ECOWAS into some sort of conflict of interest. 
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Theme 2: Integrated Threat Management. The concept of integrated threat 
management generated exciting discussions. Discussions on the concept came up when 
the topic was introduced or when respondents were asked about the concept as part of 
follow-on questions to determine interviewees’ views on ECOWAS’ application of 
integrated threat management process. Integrated threat management has been defined in 
this study as a comprehensive and nuanced approach to identifying and analyzing multi-
layered threats to regional security and timely implementation of appropriate pre-emptive 
and remedial measures to address the menace. Some of the prominent issues that emerged 
during discussions on this theme included further clarifications of the concept and any 
clear distinction between the threat integration approach the study was advancing and 
ECOWAS’ institutional integration approach. The integrated threat approach and 
coordination mechanisms emerged as subthemes. 
Integrated threat approach. Out of all the 12 respondents, only Participant 9 
indicated familiarity with the concept of integrated threat management. During the data 
collection, it was apparent that although respondents comprehended an integrated threat 
approach, it was within the context of stakeholder agencies and institutions working 
together in a coordinated manner. For example, Participant 11 cited a "lack of 
information sharing among stakeholders and inadequate interagency interactions" as part 
of the significant problems the ECOWAS commission was using integrated approach 
concept to address. Participant 11 also understood the interconnected nature of the new 
and emerging threats to security in the region but agreed he was not aware of a 
framework where all the security threats and drivers were put together on a matrix for 
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analysis. Participant 11 went further to indicate that “the threat integrated approach will 
be a highly beneficial concept if adopted to complement what ECOWAS has.”   
Participant 8’s initial reaction on the integrated threat approach model as a 
security analysis tool for ECOWAS was 
As I said, everything in ECOWAS is integrated. There is no way you can remain 
in your country and say that you are analyzing if you do not know what is 
happening in your neighboring countries. For example, in terms of analysis, 
somebody in Burkina Faso may not be interested in what is happening in Ghana. 
If you have 15 national early warning and response in each national mechanism, it 
will help feed into the regional security architecture. 
With further probing questions and prompts regarding the thrust of the integrated threat 
approach concept, Participant 8 stated that “This integrated threat approach will fit very 
well in the ECPF. I am pretty sure those responsible for the ECPF will be keen to take 
your ideas on this model for inclusion. That will be great.”     
Participant 5 acknowledged the importance of the concept as a useful security 
management tool, said that “With the inherent complexity and fast-changing threat 
elements in West Africa's security space, the integrated threat management in this context 
will surely be an indispensable tool for ECOWAS to be ahead of the menace." Likewise, 
Participant 9 indicated that "The concept is long overdue. Seriously, it is a 'must-have' for 
the ECOWAS Commission. They are responsible for the ECOWAS doctrine on security. 
The integrated threat approach must be fully incorporated to match the current security 
threats in the region." Participant 9 went on by lamenting that “Even the existing system 
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of integration at institutional and agency levels within ECOWAS and between ECOWAS 
and its close partners in the region’s security management suffers from a lack of 
cooperation and inefficient coordination mechanisms.”  
Participant 1 referred to the ECPF as "the 'mother document' that encompasses all 
doctrinal and integration matters. However, the document seems to be a work in progress. 
It is not detailed enough, lacks a precise plan with assigned departmental and individual 
accountability" Participant 1 also noted that 
The absence of an integrated threat approach limits ECOWAS' ability to conduct 
planning to manage or to meaningfully contribute toward those new and emerging 
threats to security in the region. Now externally led institutions like the G5 Sahel 
and the MNJTF have a better grasp of these threats posed by violent extremist 
groups in the region. They are in full control. 
Coordination. Interviews conducted pointed to the need for an efficient 
coordination mechanism at various levels to ensure effective implementation of the threat 
integration concept. Participant 9 stated that an "effective coordination mechanism is a 
vital component for any framework to operate. He added that,  
I think this (coordination) may involve developing a matrix to support it. Security 
analysts can then use the products from threat integration to assist decision-
makers in understanding each threat's modus operandi, critical vulnerabilities, and 
how they interrelate in the operational space. Getting this right will enhance the 
analytical process. You get to appreciate the security environment better for 
options to be generated to deal with the problem.     
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According to Participant 10, "in an integrated approach, coordination is everything." 
Thomson further indicated that it is not enough to roll out a high sounding framework 
without backing it up with appropriate coordination instruments to guide its 
implementation." He also added that "every integrated approach hinges on information 
sharing. Let me also clarify that every coordination measure will require information 
sharing among the stakeholders to be effective. Participant 10 concluded that "The 
ECOWAS Commission may need to be deliberate about its (coordination) 
implementation, or the integrated approach will also count among the list heap of 
documents awaiting attention at the headquarters."  
Participant 12 explained that ECOWAS must pursue the threat integration idea 
and enhance its coordination mechanisms to avoid operational confusion. She declared 
that "Post integration matters that especially arise could derail the whole efforts. We can 
avoid interagency and thematic confusion by establishing effective coordination 
measures that focus all efforts toward attaining the overall objective." For Participant 8, 
"focus on tangible and achievable goals cuts out unnecessariness and makes it easier for 
planners, role players, and decision-makers to pull their capacities and capabilities 
together to contain the threat." 
Research Question 2 
RQ2: How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security 
problems that confront the region? I identified two main themes and seven subthemes in 
RQ2. Theme 3 – ECOWAS’ preparedness has the following subthemes: force generation, 
decentralization of national response mechanisms, Lack of Supranational Sanctioning 
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Instrument, and coordination mechanisms. Theme 4 - ECOWAS peace and security 
architecture has the following subthemes: ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 
early warning mechanisms, and ECOWAS standby force.  
Theme 3: ECOWAS Preparedness toward Managing Regional Security. All 
respondents interviewed also testified to the regional organization's ability to use military 
and diplomatic means to address conflicts in the region. ECOWAS preparedness toward 
those interventions was, to a large extent, attributed to the institution's ability to generate 
force and its decentralized national response mechanism. The respondents were equally 
unanimous in acknowledging that the organization was fraught with problems that 
hindered its preparatory efforts such as lack of potent supranational sanctioning 
instrument, and weak coordination system. 
Force generation. The force generation subtheme referred to ECOWAS' 
preparatory arrangements in the context of its ability to generate a representational force 
across member states whenever it anticipated the application of force to address 
problems. According to Participant 4, the United Nations Charter, the United Nations 
principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union made legitimate for ECOWAS to use force as part of its conflict management 
strategy. Participant 4 also postulated that the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
(ECPF) was given effect by a Plan of Action (PoA) that, among other arrangements, 
activates the deployment of the ECOWAS Stand-By Force (ESBF). 
In Participant 5's view, the ESBF has been successful in no small extent because 
of the commitment of a handful of member states who have continuously played lead 
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roles in troop deployments. Participant 5 cites how ECOMOG's Nigerian led preemptive 
deployments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea Bissau, and the 
Gambia saved the region from catastrophic civil wars. Both Participant 5 and Participant 
3 asserted that, in most cases, the timely intervention of the ESBF had worked. However, 
participant 6 was emphatic that ECOMOG's intervention activities were not applied 
evenly across all countries. For example, Participant 6 compared how ECOWAS used 
military forces to pressurize President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia out of power 
whereas, the same organization overlooked similar cases involving Guinea and Togo. 
Participant 6 also capped his assertion with an example in a rhetorical question that “For 
example, how do you expect President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo to allow an 
organization he was leading to intervene in his country?" Therefore, it became evident 
during the study that ECOWAS' resolve to apply military force in member states had 
been selective. Thus, the level of each country's military and diplomatic clout determined 
how it ma its security problems were managed. 
Decentralization of national response mechanisms. The need to decentralize the 
various national response mechanisms also came up during the interviews. Participant 7 
indicated that the regional level frameworks depended so much on the information feeds 
they received from the member states. He, however, revealed that virtually all member 
states have a centralized national response system that does not facilitate the easy 
acquisition of inputs from the suburban areas across the region. Participant 9 indicated 
that having a decentralized national response network that had links with the regional 
architecture will seep the information acquisition process down to grassroots levels, 
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enhance policy development, and also facilitate the planning and implementation of 
programs.  
Participant 11 extolled ECOWAS Commission's determination to ensuring 
interagency coordination among member states. He also indicated his satisfaction with 
ECOWAS' cooperation with multilateral institutions toward a speed response to conflicts 
in the region. Participant 11 added that through the West African Police Information 
System (WAPIS) program, member states, ECOWAS Commission, the International 
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the European Union (EU) were 
collaborating in a centralized data sharing arrangements to hinder criminality in the 
region. Participant 12 agreed with Participant 11 but also pointed out that the centralized 
option for the WAPIS program faced take-off delays due to technical, administrative, and 
financial constraints. Hence, a decentralized option was, thus, pursued as a stop-gap 
measure. 
Lack of potent supranational sanctioning instrument. The interviews revealed 
that many intervention initiatives were frustrated by leaders and representatives of 
member states who thought their parochial interests would be unfavorably affected. In 
Participant 11's view, ECOWAS lacked a robust supranational sanctioning mechanism 
for whipping defaulting member states. He cited Nigeria's arbitrary border closures in 
defiance of the organization's agreements and protocols. 
Participant 6 asserted that leaders with clout among the organization's 
membership mostly exhibited defiance and impunity. Participant 10 mentioned "Nigeria, 
Togo, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau as some of the countries that have exhibited that 
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nonconformist posture without being appropriately sanctioned." Participant 10 further 
posited that:   
ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Mali 
succeeded because their respective leaders - Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, Foday 
Sankoh, Yahya Jammeh, and Capt Amadou Sanogo either did not or might have 
lost favor among the influential members of the organization at the time.    
Coordination mechanisms. The concept of coordination as a critical component 
in the successful conduct of planning and preparatory works kept popping up in all the 
interviews. All the respondents held the view that ECOWAS, as a regional organization, 
ECOWAS needed a robust coordination mechanism that could galvanize member states 
to support its preparatory activities. Data gathered indicated that ECOWAS’ coordination 
role was central to the planning and preparation of the region's security management 
arrangements. However, for coordination to be effective, it needed to end with each 
component fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities toward achieving the common 
goal. For instance, Participant 6, while lamenting the organization’s coordination 
problems, indicated that "ECOWAS is just a secretariat, they can only coordinate." 
Participant 10 affirmed Participant 6's position when he stated the following: "as much as 
possible, what ECOWAS can do is to play facilitating the role of giving that kind of 
coordinating platform, but it is the member states who ultimately call the shots." 
Participant 9 stated that "many ECOWAS Commission's major planning 
programs dare thwarted by disinterest from some key member states. In this case, all the 
coordination activities are nip in the bud." He also added that "one of the reasons for 
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transforming the ECOWAS Secretariat into ECOWAS Commission was to de-emphasis 
winding conventions and protocols by enhancing the Commission's ability to coordinate 
decisions from the ECOWAS Authority without passing them through lengthy national 
ratification processes." He, however, quizzed, "but what do we see going on now?" It is 
the same Heads of Governments who paralyze the process through other means like 
withholding troop contributions and deployments, slow-paced diplomatic accesses, and 
squeezing funds for the commission's preparatory works." He concluded. 
Theme 4: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. Under this theme, 
respondents discussed ECPF. The ECPF included early warning mechanisms, ECOWAS’ 
anti-terrorism plan, and ECOWAS’ management of intraregional and cross-regional 
initiatives. All the respondents acknowledged that, despite all the security management 
mechanisms, the ECOWAS peace and security architecture continued to face many 
challenges. In this regard, Participant 3 stated that "ECOWAS as an institution may have 
to play its role, but there are obvious implementation challenges with some of these 
documents. There are also lots of issues with resources; member states' political will 
especially." Participant 9 indicated that: 
Ironically, some of these security management mechanisms represent the same 
issues that confront the ECOWAS security architecture. Consider the difficulties 
ECOWAS goes through with member states any time it has to mobilize troops 
from its rapid response standby force. Also, look at the struggle it undergoes in 
mobilizing funding and logistical support to kick-start its counterterrorism plans. 
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The mountain of problems it has in dealing with various rival counterterrorism 
groups across the region will help you understand my point. 
ECOWAS conflict prevention framework. In ECOWAS' strife to addressing the 
difficulties it has with managing security issues in the region, it, in January 2008, crafted 
the ECPF to guide its conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of conflict 
prevention protocols, agreements, and instruments. The documents included the 1977 
Accord on Non‐Aggression and Defence (ANAD), The 1981 Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance and Defence (PMAD); The 1993 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS; The 
Declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of 
Light Weapons; and The 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace‐keeping, and Security. The ECPF articulates 
measures for implementing the provisions of the 1999 Mechanism with a focus on 
conflict prevention, human security, and peacebuilding.   
Participant 5 listed some of the related ECPF objectives include: Mainstreaming 
conflict prevention into ECOWAS' operational mechanism; deepening conceptual 
understanding of conflict prevention; strengthening member states' and CSOs' conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding capacity; and enabling ECOWAS' planning and execution 
capabilities in proactive, integrated conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies. 
Participant 5 also took a more in-depth insight into what he thought the human security 
aspect of what the ECPF was to achieve and concluded:  
If you look at current or modern security issues, we are looking at issues of 
human security. If I say human security, I mean people-centered security, 
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whereby we are looking at people's needs. In terms of the ECOWAS security 
management system, there has to be a drastic shift from the state-centered 
approach to the human-centered approach. We can make a lot of progress in 
managing our security system when we address people's needs. 
In the same light, Participant 12 indicated that "ECOWAS has demonstrated some 
capacity to apply a combination of military and non-military approaches to preventing, 
mitigating, or containing conflicts in the region." She cited ECOWAS’ use of a 
combination of military threats and diplomatic engagements to force Captain Amadou 
Sanogo of Mali and Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia to hand over power without furthering 
conflicts in 2012 and 2016 respectively. However, she added her voice to the human 
security imperatives the ECPF is meant to highlight by asserting:    
The ECPF seeks to ensure regional security from the grassroots; hence, the phrase 
"from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of the people" became the 
organization's key slogan. Accordingly, ECOWAS designed the framework to 
focus more on human security with an emphasis on conflict prevention through a 
comprehensive peacebuilding strategy. 
Early warning mechanisms. According to Participant 8, ECOWAS mainly 
operates a dualistic Early Warning system comprising internal and external sources for 
getting timely information on threats to security in the region. ECOWAS established its 
internal Early Warning system as part of Article 58 of the revised Treaty and the Protocol 
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security. The external sources comprised the organization's 
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partnership with the ECOWAS member states, other regional organizations. The external 
sources also included Civil Society Organizations like WANEP and the Reacting to Early 
Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD), which is part of a broader U.S. 
Government Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP). 
The information on the ECOWAS Early Warning System was corroborated by 
Participants 1, 2, and 6. Participants 6 and 1 were unanimous in the ECOWAS Early 
Warning System's effectiveness. They also added that the existing cooperation among the 
various stakeholders was being coordinated by the WAPIS. WAPIS is a data-sharing 
institution created in 2010 under the auspices of the European Development Fund to 
monitor transnational crime and terrorism in West Africa.   
The ECOWAS standby force. The ECOWAS standby force is one of the critical 
components of the ECPF. Participant 9 assessed the long-standing capacity problems of 
ECOWAS, and instead demanded ECOWAS to explore the possibilities in deepening its 
security cooperation with the AU on the African Standby Force (ASF) to mitigate its 
challenges. Participant 9 eulogized the successes of the ESF among other Regional 
Communities’ standby for arrangements and clarified that: 
The ESF is the ECOWAS component of the ASF and is under the Operational 
Control of the African Union. Per the AU policy doctrine, each Regional 
Community on the continent was to compose a regional standby contingent, 
comprising multidisciplinary military, police and civilian components, ready to be 
deployed to intervene in critical security situations. The ESF may need to 
leverage on the standby arrangement with the ASF to enhance its capacity. 
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Participant 7 was with the opinion that the Standby Forces concept needed an 
overhaul to make it more effective. He called for better coordination measures and 
stakeholder cooperation to facilitate cross-regional support among the various Regional 
Communities. He illustrated that:  
If, for example, ECOWAS needed troop or logistical assistance for imminent 
deployment, they should contact SADC directly without passing through the AU 
bureaucracies." "Although this might require some bilateral arrangements among 
the Regional Communities, it will ease a lot of pressure on them and their troop-
contributing countries. 
Participant 2 began by stating that ECOWAS' preparedness toward internecine 
conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone was especially commendable. However, he 
lamented that “the organization's overdependence on external support, lead-nation, and a 
few regular troop-contributing countries; while a bulk of the member states stood aloof, 
engendered fatigue among these particular group of stakeholders." He expressed his 
reservations about the ESF's ability to contain new and emerging security threats. He 
indicated that "ECOWAS needs to do something very drastic to be able to turn the tide in 
its favor. Also, in line with Participant 7's viewpoint, Participant 2 said that. 
Even though ECOWAS has many security-related protocols and agreements, deep 
operational experience, and better security management record when compared 
with other Regional Communities on the continent, the evolving nature of threats 
in the region has overwhelmed those capacities. The organization has bitter 
experiences with handling the Malian crisis, management of terrorist threats in the 
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region, and the lusterless external donor support. ECOWAS may, therefore, have 
to review its support base to include bilateral arrangements with sister Regional 
Communities on the continent to enhance the ESF's capacity. 
Research Question 3 
RQ3 - What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme 
of conflict management strategy? This RQ had one theme, three subthemes, and two sub-
subthemes. The subthemes comprised non-adherence to existing agreements and 
protocols, funding, and external interference. The theme of external interference had 
direct interference and indirect interference as sub-sub-themes. 
Theme 5: Mandate Implementation Challenges. Respondents cited the 
mandate subthemes like non-adherence to existing agreements and protocols, funding, 
and external interference as some of the factors militating against ECOWAS’ ability to 
implement the action plan for its conflict prevention framework. 
Nonadherence to existing agreements and protocols. ECOWAS’ adopted the 
ECPF in its quest to operationalize the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. Member states' 
adherence to existing security protocols and agreements was considered as vital to 
mandate implementation by all respondents. Participant 6 summed it succinctly as 
follows: 
I think, for me, if you read the various protocols or mechanisms, for instance, on 
peacekeeping, conflict management, and all that, you will realize that it is clear. 
In terms of the strategy, I think my issue is probably with their implementation. 
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Even when you take the ECPF, it is clearly defined, and it is good that it is not 
just ECOWAS itself going out there to implement all these strategies but also 
about the involvement of key stakeholders – the member states. 
Participant 10 indicated that "the protocol that set up of the security architecture 
are all available, but the implementation largely also rests with member states." He also 
expressed disquiet at some member state leaders who were so influential in the region 
that they could frustrate any effort by ECOWAS when they felt implementation could 
threaten their interests. Participant 10 also mentioned Guinea, where many attempts by 
ECOWAS to mediate electoral disputes were rejected and eventually postponing the 
elections. Participant 9 expressed similar sentiments by stating that, "one single most 
troublesome challenge to ECOWAS' mandate implementation is the apathy of some 
member states' and even sometimes, the mightier ones who deliberately outmaneuver the 
organization and obstructing its efforts.       
Funding. The low financial capacity of governments in the region has hampered 
their ability to support ECOWAS’ programs. For instance, Participant 5 indicated that 
many countries in the West African community could not honor their financial 
obligations to ECOWAS because of their low financial capacities. Participant 9 submitted 
that "The region's low economic base is part of the reasons for its inability to finance 
ECOWAS programs adequately. Governments would normally prioritize their internal 
security over funding the organization."    
Notes taken during the interviews generally pointed to a direct correlation 
between ECOWAS funding problems and its ability to implement programs. Participant 4 
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expressed the view that “implementation of new frameworks by ECOWAS has been 
hindered by the organization's inability to generate funds.” Participant 2 indicated that the 
funding problems have resulted in ECOWAS, soliciting for financial assistance from 
entities outside the region like the UN, EU, AU, and more affluent countries like the 
United States and some in Europe. Participant 2 added that most of this support either 
failed or came with donor conditionalities that were not favorable to the organization's 
core objectives.   
Participant 4 summed-up the effects of ECOWAS’ weak financial capacity on its 
ability to implement mandates. He said, "We can have all the robust measures or 
whatever, but if we don't have the internally generated funds to implement them, they 
will just be on the shelves, and nothing will happen." Thus, the prevailing fragile 
economic circumstances among ECOWAS member states have contributed to their 
inability to fully fund the organization's budget. The state of affairs has compelled 
ECOWAS to depend mainly on unreliable foreign support and conditionality, which 
ultimately affects effective mandate implementation.  
External interference: The ECOWAS region has a long history of foreign 
interference in its internal affairs. Interviewees made references to external intrusion as 
an inhibiting factor in ECOWAS' mandate implementation. Generally, respondents made 
two significant allusions to foreign interventions affecting ECOWAS' programs. These 
have been sub-subthemed as direct interference and indirect interference. The two 
constructs are, however, not wholly distinct from each other. They are interrelated and 
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are manipulated by the perpetrators in a mutually reinforcing manner to achieve their 
objectives. 
Direct external interference. Direct external interference referred to instances of 
unsolicited physical deployments of military and paramilitary troops, and intelligence 
services by countries outside the ECOWAS region. Participant 9 stated that "By directly 
deploying combat military units to Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and perhaps, Burkina Faso, and 
Niger, France is undermining ECOWAS' mandate in the region; those deployments are 
also tantamount to a regional invasion." He added that "I don't care whether they sought 
the consent of the individual countries or not; that’s another matter altogether.” 
Participant 8 deplored the establishment and operations of the French-led G5 Sahel 
infantry forces in the West African Sahel region and declared that it undermines the trust 
people have in ECOWAS as the preeminent organization with the mandate to deploy 
troops across the region.   
Indirect external interference. Indirect external interference referred to covert and 
overt activities as well as wide-ranging networks of security cooperation established by 
foreign nations with ECOWAS member states. Participant 12 described indirect external 
interference as "exploitative and more fatal to ECOWAS mandate implementation than 
the physical deployments of troops in the Sahel or the Maghreb regions; since this is how 
they (foreign powers) weaken the cohesion of the union." Participant 8 saw the external 
interference in West Africa as reminiscent of the power play of the Congo. He further 
explained that "In this ECOWAS region, however, I see the competition for 
preponderance between France and Nigeria. While Nigeria might represent ECOWAS' 
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interest, France is engaged in protecting its neocolonial interest." Participant 8 further 
indicated that "Although there are others like the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
even China involved, these countries’ intrusion is not as pervasive as that of France. The 
effects of their activities on the region's stability are enormous."   
Participant 10 explained his view on external interference as follows: "G5- Sahel 
is being funded and spearheaded by France. Some of the countries involved in G5 Sahel 
are not even part of ECOWAS. ECOWAS has no control, and it has no troops in the 
Sahel." Participant 10 went on to add that, "Countries like France and others have their 
interest that dictates some of the policies. Whether those policies affect ECOWAS or not, 
they don't care. It's only about achieving their aims." Participant 2 explained his notion of 
indirect external interference when he said, "look at the information of the G5 Sahel. You 
can also link that to our colonial history where France and some member states have 
post-colonial arrangements binding them to channel resources to G5 Sahel rather than 
ECOWAS." 
Participant 5's comment on the interference was about how former colonial 
masters extended their rivalries than in Europe to Anglo-Franco-Lusophone divide in 
West Africa. He indicated that “this divide has become pervasive. It has therefore made it 
difficult for member states to have consensus on matters of common interest.” Regarding 
the colonial divide, Participant 9 said that "You see, the seed of division sowed by 
France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom in the region have gain roots, and they 
continue to nourish it to sustain their exploitative activities." He added that "Some of 
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these European countries see ECOWAS as a stumbling block and would do anything to 
degrade its influence in the region."  
Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed the setting for the research, the demographics, data 
collection, and data analysis. I provided the outcomes of the analysis of 12 interviews 
conducted and documents reviewed from the data gathered. Using the NVivo software, I 
established five main themes, 14 subthemes, and two sub-subthemes for the analysis. I 
also applied a thematic analysis framework to identify themes and interpret the data 
collected. 
In RQ1, participants testified to ECOWAS’ effectiveness in its use of military and 
diplomatic means to address conflicts in the region. Participants indicated that, while 
ECOWAS' ability to generate expeditionary force was comparably more effective than 
other regional communities on the continent, the organization’s effectiveness in the 
management of new and emerging threats to regional security needed improvement. 
Also, three respondents stated that ECOWAS is required to be empowered with a more 
potent supranational sanctioning instrument to be able to bring recalcitrant leaders to 
order. Five participants admitted that adopting an integrated threat concept will enhance 
ECOWAS' security management and also advocated for a more pragmatic coordination 
system to improve the organization's effectiveness in the region's security management.  
RQ2 sought responses to ECOWAS preparedness in managing new and emerging 
security problems in the region. Participants mentioned the ECOWAS Commission as the 
critical branch at the ECOWAS headquarters that was mandated by the peace and 
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security provisions of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty to manage regional security. 
Participants highlighted the contrast between ECOWAS’ better preparedness toward 
interventions in internecine conflicts and its lackluster approach toward the new and 
emerging threats to security. The ECOWAS’ overdependence on external support, a lead 
nation like Nigeria, and a few regular troop-contributing countries engendered resource 
fatigue among these particular groups of stakeholders. 
RQ3 related to the implementation challenges that confront ECOWAS in its 
management of regional security problems. Especially the new and emerging threats to 
peace and stability. Responses from theme five mainly addressed this research question. 
Generally, responses from interviews and documents analyzed recognized ECOWAS’ 
successes, especially; containing civil wars in the region. Participants also acknowledged 
the various regional initiatives from both member states and CSOs in strengthening 
ECOWAS’ resolve to manage the security challenges.  
All 12 participants acknowledged the organization’s failure to replicate its 
renowned ability to manage civil wars and also admitted its inability to address the new 
and emerging threats to security like violent extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes, 
cybercrime, and transnational organized crime plaguing the region. It appeared that the 
adoption of integrated threat management as an analytical concept could give impetus for 
operationalizing the ECPF and consequently enhance ECOWAS' ability to mitigate the 
threats to regional security. It also emerged from the responses that the coordination 
measures to facilitate effective implementation of the ECPF were inadequate. Participants 
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admitted the need for additional physical coordination mechanisms with a framework for 
accountability at all levels of responsibility to ensure its effectiveness.    
In Chapter 5, I provided my interpretations and findings from the themes as they 
related to the research questions. I then discussed the limitations of the study and made 
recommendations for adoption by ECOWAS and future studies. I also discussed the 
study's implications for social change. 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Although ECOWAS has successfully combined military deployments with 
diplomatic engagements to contain internecine conflicts that bedeviled some member 
states, it has continued to grapple with the sustenance of the region’s fragile peace and 
democratic experiments. The emergence of new and emerging threats to peace and 
security has added another layer of security threat to the existing internecine conflicts. 
The twin threats of internal conflicts and new and emerging security threats have thrown 
ECOWAS' strategies off-balance, rendering it ineffective (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; 
Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). The worsening security situation in West Africa has denigrated 
the quality of life of its citizens (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; von Soest, & De Juan, 2018). 
The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West 
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to regional security management in West Africa. 
The research was a qualitative exploratory case study. I used purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques. I relied on in-depth interviews and intertextual analysis of 
documents. I recruited practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, think 
tanks/subject matter experts from WANEP, and academic researchers from KAIPTC and 
NDC. The study’s focus was on understanding the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS’ 
approach to the region’s security challenges. 
The study revealed that although ECOWAS had adopted an integrated approach 
concept, it was within the cooperation and coordination of stakeholder agencies and 
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institutions. No existing data indicated ECOWAS’ application of the integrated threat 
management concept, nor was such a proposal found in any literature, thus justifying the 
relevance of the research. Therefore, this study has proffered the application of integrated 
threat management as a potent operational concept for handling the region’s security 
setting's growing complexity. 
Interpretation of the Findings  
The study was qualitative with a focus on formative evaluation research 
methodology. The methodology enhanced the depth and rigor in analyzing the themes 
emerging from responses on ECOWAS’ effectiveness, preparations, and implementation 
challenges in its approach to regional security management. I applied the PET and PFT to 
conceptualize the problem in the context of ECOWAS’ security management strategies in 
a wide range of regional and sociopolitical circumstances. 
I applied the thematic analysis framework in reviewing the main themes and 
subthemes to answer the RQs. Adopting the thematic analysis framework enabled me to 
substantiate crosscutting issues from responses to the RQs. I identified two main themes 
and six subthemes for RQ1; two main themes and seven subthemes for RQ2; and one 
central theme, three subthemes, and two sub-subthemes for RQ3. 
Research Question 1 
RQ1 was, how effective is ECOWAS’ current approach to security management 
in the region?  
Theme 1: Effectiveness of ECOWAS. Responses gathered on the effectiveness 
of ECOWAS in regional security management indicated that the organization has been 
     112 
 
 
successful in dealing with member states’ internal conflicts but unsuccessful in managing 
the new and emerging threats to security afflicting the region. Apart from responses from 
the interviews, there were commentaries from academia, security experts, and 
practitioners on ECOWAS' effectiveness in shifting or adjusting strategies to contain 
security problems in the region (Odobo et al., 2017; Lar, 2009). Other researchers also 
established that ECOWAS was the only entity with strong organizational capacity and the 
mandate to conduct peace operations across the region (Odobo et al., 2017). Findings 
from the data gathered for this study, however, indicated that the organization needed to 
rethink its response to asymmetric security threats like violent extremism, transnational 
organized crimes, and terrorism that continue to ravage the region. Theme 1 had the 
following subthemes: successful interventions, unsuccessful interventions, and 
involvement of CSOs. 
I identified two main perspectives for respondents’ assessments of the 
accomplishment of the successful intervention subtheme. While one view centered on the 
intervention processes, the other was aligned to the mission's end-state to evaluate its 
success. Although both the process and the end-state criteria provided a sound basis for 
assessment, it is the former that determines the worth of the latter in peace operations. 
Hence, the process becomes weightier in evaluating ECOWAS' effectiveness. In 
explaining the standards required for assessing what constitutes successful intervention 
peace operations in Africa, Rodriguez (2015) indicated that experts have associated the 
most successful peacekeeping missions with effective political strategies, clear goals, and 
expectations, and were well trained and funded. 
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Responses for the unsuccessful intervention subtheme mainly consisted of 
ECOWAS’ lackluster handling of new and emerging security threats in the region. The 
Boko Haram terror crisis, the terror crisis in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of West 
Africa, the thriving transnational organized crime, and cybercrime in the region came up 
as problems that ECOWAS had failed in addressing. Some of the reasons assigned for 
ECOWAS’ failures included the ineffectiveness of its conflict management strategies, 
interferences of powerful foreign countries in the region’s security affairs, and the 
overlapping nature of the crisis beyond the organization’s jurisdiction.  
All the reasons adduced for unsuccessful interventions subtheme sounded 
reasonable; however, the most emphasized was ECOWAS’ ineffectiveness in conflict 
management strategies. The PET states that organizational structures are characterized by 
stability and incrementalism; stability referred to a long period of the relatively 
unchanged form (stasis), and incrementalism, a radical change over a short period 
(Desmarais, 2019; Sabatier & Weible, 2018, p. 55). By inference, ECOWAS' period of 
stasis (while managing intrastate and election-related conflicts) was punctuated by new 
and emerging security threats that require the adoption of the appropriate conflict 
management strategy to handle.  
Respondents called on ECOWAS to increase the involvement of CSOs and 
improve its engagement of regional and subregional groups operating in the region’s 
peace and security space. The call was right since information acquisition is a critical 
factor in the planning and execution of security operations. CSOs such as WANEP and 
REWARD have the reach and access to vital information on security-related matters in 
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the region up to the grassroots level. Forging greater collaboration with them can enhance 
the triggering of early warning of imminent threats to peace and security and improve 
ECOWAS' operational planning process. 
Theme 2: Integrated Threat Management. Just having a plan does not provide 
an adequate guarantee for the successful conduct of security operations. It is the 
employment of an appropriate concept for the planning process that ensures the plan's 
thoroughness and credibility. It emerged during the data collection that ECOWAS had 
not been practicing the integrated threat management approach as part of its regional 
security planning strategy. It also appeared that the system of integrated approach 
practiced by the ECOWAS Commission pertained to creating stronger bonds among 
military, police, and civilians in the planning and execution of operations. For example, 
ECOWAS had programs for strengthening interagency collaborations like the ECOWAS 
Integrated Maritime Strategy and WAPIS.  
Additionally, the integrated approach as envisaged in the key objectives of the 
ECPF reiterated the thrust toward the interagency approach. ECOWAS crafted the 
counterterrorism strategy to give effect to aspects of the ECPF. The ECOWAS 
counterterrorism strategy also recognized “the linkages between terrorism and other 
forms of criminality, including trans-national organized crimes” (ECOWAS, 2016f, 
preamble, para. 13). Indeed, literature has established connections between these new and 
emerging threats as one layer and the existing destructive conflicts as another (Aning & 
Pokoo, 2014; Cherkaoui, 2017; Marc et al., 2015; Security Council Report 2011;UN 
News, 2019). Therefore, it is surprising that ECOWAS failed to notice the nexus between 
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the two layers of threats to regional security for inclusion in the ECPF and the ECOWAS 
counterterrorism strategy. 
In planning and strategizing for security operations, continuous analysis of the 
threat factor is a vital step. Planners must, therefore, keep focus continually on the threat 
and avoid distractions. Setting up interagency networks and coordination systems will 
help in the efficient mobilization of resources and information sharing. Such networks 
and coordination systems cannot replace or diminish the importance of a threat-focused 
process in security management.   
It emerged from the data collection that ECOWAS lagged in having a 
determinative coordination instrument that will guide the implementation of the 
organization's frameworks and strategies. Even the best plan can fail if coordination 
derogated. Besides that, issues regarding information sharing and interagency 
competition came up as severe drawbacks to the organization's existing coordination 
arrangements. Considering ECOWAS' stakeholder dynamics, both the conduct and the 
implementation of the integrated threat management products will depend on an enduring 
coordination arrangement to be effective. On that account, the integrated threat 
management approach will require a simultaneous improvement of the existing 
coordination measures to make it operational.  
RQ1 was the overarching question for the study. The main objective of the 
question was to ascertain how effective the ECOWAS approach has been in managing 
the complex security threats confronting West Africa. It emerged that although 
ECOWAS had succeeded in containing intrastate conflicts, it has been unsuccessful in its 
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response to the nonconventional security threats that continued to devastate the region. 
Although ECOWAS had rolled out the ECPF, a counterterrorism strategy, and some 
interagency integration arrangements to contain the problem, it appeared that it failed to 
consider the nexus between the two layers of threats in the entire scheme. The PFT 
provides a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles. ECOWAS needs to 
incorporate integrated threat management as part of the conceptual approach to enhance 
the effectiveness of its security management strategy.  
Research Question 2 
RQ2 was, how well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security 
problems that confront the region? 
Theme 3: ECOWAS Preparedness toward Managing Regional Security. 
Successful implementation of security plans hinges on how thorough the preparation 
stage was carried out. Discussion on the theme revolved around ECOWAS’ ability to 
deploy troops, decentralization of national response mechanisms, lack of supranational 
sanctioning instrument, and coordination mechanisms. Respondents unanimously 
assessed ECOWAS' preparation toward regional security management as a mixture of 
successes and failures. 
On the organization's ability to generate expeditionary force to maintain or restore 
peace and security across the region, it was realized that ECOWAS was comparatively 
successful in intrastate conflicts than in the new and emerging threats to regional security. 
Planning is not only a prerequisite for the conduct of security operations; it traverses the 
entire process since there must be a continuous reevaluation of the situation. The 
     117 
 
 
planning stage dovetails into preparation, so without its constant evaluation, a gap created 
can reduce the effectiveness of the preparatory phase of the operation. The planning-
preparation gap became apparent as many interventions rolled out by ECOWAS to 
manage the region's security failed to suppress the new and emerging threats that have 
overwhelmed substantial parts of the area.     
The study results revealed that the centralized nature of national response 
mechanisms among ECOWAS member states hampered smoother preparations toward 
the execution of the organization's operational mandate. Also, the weak bond between 
national response networks and ECOWAS Commission led to delays and, sometimes, 
abortive security missions.  ECOWAS realized the gap and introduced the WAPIS and 
ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy interagency coordination programs and 
initiatives like the ECOWAS Vision 2020 - a people-centered and people-driven 
document to reduce the state-centric tendencies among members. ECOWAS 
Commission, the implementing department of ECOWAS-led security missions, relies 
heavily on national institutions for technical, administrative, and financial support for 
preparatory activities. The ECOWAS Commission would have to fashion out a 
mechanism to sustain the momentum of the initiatives it has rolled out toward enhancing 
integration.  
It emerged from the study that member states' egoistic attitude and neglect to 
honor conventions, protocols, and agreements contributed to ECOWAS' inability to carry 
out some missions. Instances, where some countries could decide not to comply with the 
organization's resolutions or cooperate with the ECOWAS Commission, they undermine 
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the entire security management process by honoring their contribution toward planned 
missions. The need for a potent supranational sanctioning instrument must be taken 
seriously. ECOWAS can check those acts of impunity by applying the instrument to 
sanction defaulting member states. 
Coordination is the fulcrum for all preparatory activities. For coordination to be 
effective, it needs a sound planning doctrine that is understood and committed to by all 
stakeholders, proper communication channels, and a functioning framework for 
accountability at all levels. Even though ECOWAS had some coordination arrangements 
in place, they lacked those qualities. Respondents lamented that member states' 
commitment to ECOWAS' security management activities was not enabling. Also, the 
lack of functioning accountability framework allowed security architecture players and 
other stakeholders to abdicate responsibilities since they could easily shift the blame 
elsewhere.   
Theme 4: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. The ECOWAS revised 
treaty of 1993 incorporated issues on security, conflict resolution, and giving the primary 
responsibility for the full and effective implementation of strategy with member states. 
The 2019 ECOWAS Counterterrorism Action Plan also maintains the primary 
responsibility for implementing the plan with member states (ECOWAS, 1993; 
ECOWAS, 2019c). Although ECOWAS has developed additional strategies and 
frameworks like the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 and the ECOWAS 
Counterterrorism Action Plan, all those initiatives were mostly a regurgitation of previous 
arrangements. There were no significant shifts that strengthened the ECOWAS 
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Commission's remit in security management. Consigning the ECOWAS Commission to 
coordination roles while assigning the responsibility for implementation to member states 
have contributed to many instances where the member states pick and choose which 
security threat needed urgent attention. 
It emerged from some of the documents reviewed that some ECOWAS 
governments' neglect, mistakes, and complicities in the spread of terror threats and 
violent extremism by groups like the Boko Haram, AQIM, and other criminal and terror 
affiliates operating in the Sahel region  (Feldman, 2009; Okolo & Akubo, 2019). Also, 
doctrinal differences among the member states will pose enormous challenges for 
ECOWAS in coordinating nonconventional operations because countries in the region 
have unique tactics, techniques, and procedures for asymmetric conflicts. Additionally, 
some member states were identified as members of external organizations like G5 Sahel, 
MNJTF, and the LCBC, thereby complicating the chain of command and operational 
procedures. The implication is that member states will encounter challenges relating to 
operational doctrine, conflict of interest, and command and control, which are critical 
elements in leading the implementation of strategies. 
The ECOWAS Commission stands in a better position to plan, coordinate, and 
lead the implementation of peace and security operations. The PFT provides a framework 
for managing interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles to deal with "unanticipated or 
unintended consequences of previous policy designs" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). 
The ECOWAS Commission needs to be given Operational Control and Tasking 
Authority statuses for all mission execution components to enable it to employ the peace 
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and security architecture under a unified command and control to implement its mandate 
effectively. The ECPF will need to be enhanced with a threat-focused conceptual 
approach in standardized operating procedures as well as synchronizing the headquarters 
and the ESBF elements' efforts.   
Research Question 3 
RQ3 was, what implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current 
scheme of conflict management strategy?  
Theme 5: Mandate Implementation Challenges. The susceptibility of West 
Africa to the cataclysmic global security setting has contributed to the region's fluid 
security threat landscape. Consequently, ECOWAS has, over the years, rolled out one 
peace and security initiative after another to deal with the problems found in its planning 
and implementation reviews. It was, thus, not unexpected when respondents readily 
pointed out weaknesses in the existing peace and security architecture that needed 
rectification.   
Although respondents cited problems like non-adherence to existing agreements, 
funding, and external interference, it surfaced that the ECOWAS Commission needed to 
review its operational frameworks and conceptual approach to match the ever-growing 
challenges to the region's security. Every diplomatic environment must anticipate 
nonconformities for appropriate measures to be put in place to deal with them.  Member 
states' non-adherence to agreements and protocols could, hence, be addressed by 
developing convincing conflict management alternatives that can mitigate and eventually 
contain the problem. 
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Respondents indicated that funding ECOWAS missions were one of the major 
challenges the institution faced. There are several reasons for ECOWAS' funding 
problems, including the region's low economic base that has made weaker member states 
incapable of meeting their financial obligations to the organization and donor fatigue or 
failures. ECOWAS will continue to encounter funding problems so far as the region's 
weak economy combines with the double-layered threats to peace and security to form a 
vicious cycle lingers. Also, the ECPF has 14 sets of key issue areas of focus referred to as 
14 Components (Atuobi, 2010). 
ECOWAS objectives were too many. Considering the complexities of the security 
setting of West Africa, a focused approach could be accomplished through a piecemeal or 
limited objective approach. For example, the ECPF implementation could be in phases, 
and each phase allotted a set of key focus areas for accomplishment. The limited 
objective approach will also facilitate thoroughness and enhance financial prudence.  
ECOWAS' overreliance on donor support to fund its programs and operations is 
not sustainable. The organization will continue to encounter financial difficulties since 
the funding problems have become intractable, and donors get demotivated when they 
don't see results. Similarly, Nigeria, which usually volunteered lead-nation role for most 
ECOWAS peace operations missions and bearing the bulk of the organization's 
bureaucracies at its headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, is saddled with combating the Boko 
Haram terror group. ECOWAS headquarters needs to consider a more effective security 
management strategy to motivate donors and find efficient means to get recalcitrant 
member states to honor their financial obligations. ECOWAS may also collaborate with 
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the UN to support its missions with enabling units like logistics, transport, aviation, 
engineering, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal. 
The fragility of West African economies and the countries' colonial history are 
contributing to the region's susceptibility to external influences of various forms. 
Respondents indicated that the external interferences affecting ECOWAS’ security 
management system appear directly and indirectly. ECOWAS’ dependence on external 
donor funding support for the conduct operations while also blaming foreign interference 
for its operational failures sounds paradoxical. ECOWAS needs to realize that, in 
international diplomacy, the saying that “there is no such thing as a free lunch” and quid 
pro quo are enduring principles. ECOWAS and its member states need to find ways to 
reduce donor dependency syndrome by widening its internal funding sources and 
ensuring a prudent financial system.   
Limitations of the Study 
The study type was a qualitative exploratory case study based on a formative 
evaluation research methodology. The study focused on the effectiveness of ECOWAS’ 
regional security management approach in the face of the further complications created 
by the emergence of new and emerging threats to security in West Africa. Although the 
study delved into the details of the subject matter, it has some unavoidable limitations. 
First, West Africa is linguistically diverse with French, English, and Portuguese 
as major national languages. However, I used English to collect data throughout the 
process from participants, including those from non-Anglophone countries at ECOWAS 
headquarters. The situation could have affected the quality of the response since the non-
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Anglophone participants would have been better expressing their views in their 
respective national languages. To mitigate the problem, I carried out more follow-on 
questions with the non-Anglophone participants to get into details with them and to also 
enable them to clarify their views. 
Second, the study would have benefitted from the diversity of the region if I had 
visited ECOWAS offices in one or two more countries. I would have preferably selected 
one Francophone and one Lusophone country each for a visit. However, due to financial 
constraints, I was only able to travel to Ghana and Nigeria for the data collection.  To 
make up for the dialectal deficits, I purposively skewed my interview schedules by 
shortlisting and prioritizing respondents from Francophone and Lusophone countries at 
the ECOWAS headquarters.  
Recommendations 
There are twofold recommendations for this study. The first segment pertains to 
recommendations for future research, and the second, related to ECOWAS headquarters. 
However, some recommendations may apply to both sides. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Although this study addresses a gap in the literature, there are other areas of equal 
importance that need scholarly intervention to augment ECOWAS’ security management 
strategy. Firstly, future research can delve into a new Strategic Concept for the ECOWAS 
security management system. With ECOWAS implementing integrated interagency 
security management initiatives, there is the need to adopt a new strategic concept to 
strengthen its strategic foundations and relationship with member states, partners, and 
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competing organizations engaging in peace operations in the region.  A new strategic 
concept will create the platform for strategic reorientation and consensus-building among 
stakeholders in the light of the growing complexity in the region's security environment. 
Another potential area for future research is the ECOWAS framework for 
responsibility and accountability. Although ECOWAS has adopted several protocols, 
agreements, conventions, and memoranda of understanding, it grapples with a clear and 
coherent framework that guides effective management of responsibility and 
accountability at all levels. The responsibility and accountability framework will 
facilitate organizational consistency in evaluation, prompting, and sanctioning systems to 
stimulate responsible and accountable ethics. 
Recommendations for ECOWAS Headquarters  
It was part of the study's objectives to contribute to improving ECOWAS' security 
management capabilities. Aside from future research, it is pertinent also to proffer some 
recommendations for ECOWAS headquarters. ECOWAS needs to: 
 Incorporate the integrated threat management as part of the conceptual 
approach to enhance the effectiveness of its security management strategy. 
 Cut down on headquarters bureaucracies and emphasize on threat-focused 
response to its security management architecture.  
 Increase the involvement of CSOs. 
 Promote positive engagement and collaboration with other international and 
subregional entities operating in the region’s peace and security space. 
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 Reduce donor dependency syndrome by activating alternate funding 
arrangements, widening its internal funding sources, developing a plan for 
getting all member states to honor their financial obligations, and ensuring 
prudent financial system.  
 Improve the existing coordination measures to make it operational. 
 Establish a functioning responsibility and accountability framework for all 
key appointments at all levels in its security management system.  
 Seek Operational Control and Tasking Authority statuses for all mission 
execution components to enable it to employ the peace and security assets 
under a unified command and control system for effective mandate 
implementation.  
Implications 
Implications for Social Change  
The security situation in West Africa continued to worsen as new and emerging 
threats to peace and security added another layer of problems to the existing internecine 
conflicts that have denigrated the quality of life in the region. The purpose of this study 
was to explore the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach 
to regional security management in West Africa. The main implication for positive social 
change for the study will be a region with an effective security management system that 
guarantees its citizens' hope and aspirations. A secured West Africa will provide 
confidence for the inflow of international engagements, facilitate interstate exchanges, 
and energize commercial and socio-cultural activities among its citizens.      
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Implications for Policy Making and Professional Practice  
The study was conducted based on ECOWAS’ inability to effectively manage the 
growing complexity of the security situation in West Africa. However, the 
commensurability of regional security management systems makes the study receptive to 
replications outside the context within which it was conducted. Thus, the study has 
implications for policymaking and professional practice for other regional security 
organizations and homeland security professionals. 
Policy making. Due to the increase in global security threats, many regional 
organizations have added regional security management to their remits or supported 
responsible institutions to contain the menace. It was evident from this study that while 
member states were given the responsibility to implement the mandate, the ECOWAS 
Commission was only assigned a coordination role. This policy decision needs to be 
reversed since splitting command and control in security operations often leads to 
confusion in planning and execution. It is also paradoxical for member states from whom 
the problems emanate to be the same with the primary responsibility to implement 
mission mandates to manage the impasse. Therefore, the responsibility for mandate 
implementation should be taken from member states and assigned to the ECOWAS 
Commission. Then a framework for accountability could be established for the 
Commission to be answerable to member states on mandate implementation. 
Professional practice. The study challenges the ability of staff officers at the 
ECOWAS Commission and other regional and national security management 
departments to adopt an integrated conceptual approach that is threat-focused. Adopting 
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an integrated doctrine will add another security paradigm to the existing initiatives of the 
regional and various national security institutions. The study will also inspire professional 
security officers to explore the threat-focused concept for further prospects in the security 
management industry. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I started with an introduction in which I provided a brief insight 
into the background to the problem, highlighted the purpose of the study, and described 
the research methodology and data collection process. I then presented the interpretation 
of findings using themes that emerged from each RQ and also submitted the limitations 
of the study and how I addressed them in the course of the study. I proceeded to proffer 
recommendations for future research, proposals for ECOWAS headquarters and indicated 
the implications the study can have on social change, policymaking, and professional 
practice. 
Conclusion 
West Africa faces two layers of threats to peace and security in the region. The 
first layer of threat to security is the intrastate conflicts based upon which ECOWAS 
quite successfully added regional security remit and its original mandate of promoting 
regional economic integration. The second layer of threat to security is the new and 
emerging themes like violent extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes, and 
transnational organized crimes combined with the intrastate conflicts to complicate the 
region’s security dynamics.  
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This qualitative research focused on ECOWAS’ effectiveness in managing twin 
threats and threats. I drew the findings from this study from face-to-face in-depth 
interviews and intertextual analysis of documents using the thematic analysis framework. 
I applied the purposive sampling and the snowball data collection techniques to recruit 12 
participants from the academia, subject matter experts, and practitioners who volunteered 
for the study from KAIPTC and WANEP in Ghana, and ECOWAS Headquarters and 
NDC in Nigeria. 
The study established that ECOWAS had drafted security policy documents and 
frameworks, adopted several agreements and memoranda of understanding and rolled out 
an integrated interagency security management system to strengthen coordination and 
information sharing among its agencies and partners. Similarly, several documents lauded 
ECOWAS as the best performing regional security organization in Africa, considering its 
peace operations success, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, the study 
revealed that the organization grappled with mandate implementation challenges 
emanating from member states' non-adherence to existing agreements, funding, and 
external interference. The study also uncovered that ECOWAS does not operate a threat-
focused conceptual approach like the integrated threat model as part of its regional 
security management architecture. 
The study proffered recommendations for future research and proposals for 
ECOWAS headquarters. The recommendations for future studies were: new Strategic 
Concept for ECOWAS security management system, and ECOWAS framework for 
responsibility and accountability. The ECOWAS headquarters' recommendations 
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included incorporating the integrated threat management as part of the ECOWAS 
conceptual approach, emphasizing threat-focused response, improving CSOs’ 
involvement, and collaborating with other entities operating in the region’s security 
management space. The main implication for positive social change for the study will be 
an effective regional security management system that guarantees the hopes and 
aspirations of its citizens and provides the confidence for the inflow of international 
engagements for improved living conditions. 
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Appendix A: List of Acronyms 
ANAD  Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence 
ASF  African Standby Force  
AQIM  Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
AU  African Union 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CSOs  Civil Society Organizations. 
ECOMOG  ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
ECOWARN ECOWAS Early Warning System Response Network 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
ECPF   ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework  
EIMS   ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy  
EPSAO           ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture and Operations  
ESBF  ECOWAS Stand-By Force 
EU  European Union 
EWARP  Early Warning and Response Partnership 
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism  
IAA   International Atomic Agency 
IOM  International Organization for Migration 
IRB   Institutional Review Board 
JNIM   Jama’ at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin 
KAIPTC  Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Center 
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LCB   Lake Chad Basin  
LCBC   Lake Chad Basin Commission 
MNJTF  Multinational Joint Task Force 
NDC  National Defence College (Nigeria) 
NILS   National Institute for Legislative Studies (Nigeria) 
OAU  Organization of African Unity 
PCASED Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development 
PET   Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
PFT   Policy Feedback Theory  
POA   Programme of Action  
R2P  Responsibility to Protect 
REWARD  Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa 
SADR  Saharan Arab Democratic Republic 
SALW  Small Arms and Light Weapons 
UAS   Union of African States 
UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
UIAS   Union of Independent African States 
UN  United Nations 
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WAEMU  West Africa Economic Monetary Union 
WAMA  West African Monetary Agency  
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WAMI  West African Monetary Institute 
WANEP West African Network for Peacebuilding  
WAPIS West African Police Information System  
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro 




Appendix B: Invitation Letter to Participants 
Dear … (name of participant)… 
My name is Farouck Mohammed-Bashar. I am a PhD student of Public Policy and 
Administration with specialization in Homeland Security Policy and Coordination at 
Walden University of the United States of America. My research topic is “Integrated 
Threat Management: An Alternative Approach to Regional Security System for 
ECOWAS” I obtained your contact information from the Head Office, West African 
Network for Peacebuilding. I wish to invite you to participate in this study as a 
respondent. If you agree to participate, I will arrange an interview at a time and neutral 
public location of your convenience. The interview would last for about 45 minutes and 
will be formal. My goal in this study will be to get answers toward establishing the 
reasons for the challenges of ECOWAS’ approach to the region’s security management 
with a view to proffering an alternate approach. I can assure you that I will share the 
results of the study with you. In addition, please note participation in this study is 
optional, and you may withdraw at any point of the process.  
I have provided further details of the study in the attached consent form. Your 
signature on this form means you understand the information I presented and you want to 
willingly participate. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further clarification.  
 
Thank you. 
Farouck Mohammed-Bashar 
